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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A. General Nature of Standard Setting Organization (SSO) 
In the modern economy, standards are commonly adopted to facili-
tate the communication protocols, the format of shared files, or the inter-
connectivity within the components of a single device, and the interoper-
ability and compatibility between different devices. For example, 
telephones depend on RJ-45 universal standard lines to connect to termi-
nals; communication between internet users requires shared W3C stand-
ards; and even a small chip set within a computer needs numerous stand-
ards to ensure interoperability of components produced by different 
manufacturers.1  The importance of standards is evinced by their ubiqui-
tous existence in the present day. 
On the bright side, standards “can make products less costly for firms 
to produce and more valuable to consumers. . . can increase innovation, 
efficiency, and consumer choice; foster public health and safety and serve 
as a fundamental building block for international trade.”2  On the other 
hand, the inherent “network effect” may usually bring up antitrust con-
cerns as more users use the standard.  A network effect is the phenomenon 
that the value of a product would substantially increase in proportion to 
the number of users adopting it.3  If the standard is widely accepted, the 
network effect may in the end make only one dominant standard accepta-
ble to a market, and it subsequently raises antitrust issues.4  Furthermore, 
the dominant position of the standard can exacerbate the problem if it is 
incorporated with patented technologies, and this is due to the de jure mo-
nopoly nature of the patent right granted by the United States Congress. 
 1.  See for example, one single SSO, ISO, may issue more than 2000 standards for infor-
mation technology, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards_development/list_of_iso_tech-
nical_committees.htm access 05/25 2015.  
 2.  FTC Report, Antitrust Enforcement And Intelletcual Property Rights:Promoting Inno-
vation and Competition, 2007 
 3.  Network effect refers to “the consumption value of a product or service derives from 
the number of product or service used by other people, i.e., the more people use a product or 
service, the more valuable it becomes.”  Telephone is a good example. see Michael L. Katz & 
Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 
passim (1985). 
 4.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act (2008). P.21, “Following Alcoa and American Tobacco, courts typically 
have required a dominant market share before inferring the existence of monopoly power”
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Traditionally, one patent alone generally does not have the de facto 
market power.5 However, the patentee’s de jure monopoly power over the 
market dominated by a standard would be considerably augmented if the 
network effect goes hand in hand with the patent monopoly rights.  Once 
the patent becomes a standard essential patent (SEP), the patentee acquires 
a de facto market power via the standard, and the standard is then subject 
to the potential threat of “patent holdup” and may become a “hijacked 
standard.”6  The patentee may then prevent the industry it is in from im-
plementing its technology or at least charge a higher license fee than the 
patentee should have obtained.7
A high switching cost to a design around a widely accepted standard 
further entrenches the situation.8  Designing around the “locked in” or the 
“hijacked standard” may become a commercially infeasible option.9 Firms 
may suffer loss for investment in equipment, R&D expenses, marketing 
delay, or other reasons.  One commentator addresses this patent holdup 
problem as “one of the worst outcomes for consumers to buy into a stand-
ard that is widely expected to be open, only to find it ‘hijacked’ later, after 
they are collectively locked in.”10  The hijacked standard may potentially 
 5.  “A patent does not of itself establish a presumption of market power in antitrust sense.”
See Abbott Laboratories v. F Brennan, 952 F2d 1346, (1991) citing Walker Process Eqpt., Inc. 
v. Food Machinery Corp.,382 U.S. 172 (1965) 
 6.  Federal Trade Commission Decisions Complaint: IN THE MATTER OF DELL 
COMPUTER CORPORATION, 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996): A SSO’s member, Dell, confirmed that 
the developing standard did not infringe its patent but filed patent infringement law suit against 
other members after the standard adopted the technology at dispute.  
 7.  FTC Report, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with 
Competition (March 2011) :”holdup was similarly defined as “a patentee’s ability to extract a 
higher licensing fee after an accused infringer has sunk costs into implementing the patented 
technology than the patentee could have obtained at the time of design decisions, when the pa-
tented technology competed with alternatives.”
 8.  Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach To Standards-Based Pa-
tent Licensing, 79 Antitrust L.J. 47, 2013: See FIGURE 1. Switching Cost v. Stage of Standard-
ization.  Switching cost rise sharply after the adoption of standard.  
 9.  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intelectual 
Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition 37-38 (2007); the implementer of 
standards may face high switching costs.  Also, the high switching cost can raise price, discour-
age new entry, reduce market competitiveness, and yield monopoly power. See PAUL 
KLEMPERER, Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with Appli-
cations to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 62, 515-539 (1995) 
 10.  James Bryce Clark, Technical Standards and Their Effects On E-Commerce Contracts: 
Beyond the Four Corners, Bus. Law. 345, footnote 83, 59 November, 2003 
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grant a patentee with a weak patent with a power to charge tolls on bridges 
collectively built by others SSO members.11
Antitrust enforcement authorities seek to take actions to mitigate the 
standard setting organization (SSO) patent holdup problem, and expect 
SSO to impose on its members the fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
(FRAND) and the disclosure obligation, and they are the two major patent 
misused doctrines controversially migrated to antitrust law. The appropri-
ateness of applying these two doctrines will be reviewed and discussed 
later in this article. 
B. China’s Recent SSO Antitrust Violations in Spotlight—
FRAND 
The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the US Department of 
Justice (DOJ) have recognized SSO’s holdup problem in their antitrust 
guideline,12 and the Chinese government shares the same concern with the 
FTC and DOJ. 
In 2013, Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court (IDC court) ruled 
that InterDigital Technology Corporation (IDC) possessed the market 
power in the WCDMA,CDMA2000, and TDüSCDMA SEP license mar-
kets and penalized IDC approximate 3 million USD for abusing its market 
power by committing unnecessary patent tying licensing, compelling li-
censee to grant back technology without consideration, and violating the 
FRAND obligation by discriminatorily charging Huawei SEP royalty rates 
higher than Apple and Samsung.13  It was the first time the FRAND obli-
gation appeared in a Chinese SSO’s SEP case. However, the FRAND ob-
ligation was not required by any Chinese law under its civil law system 
when the court ruled.  It was not until December. 19, 2013, months after 
the court’s ruling, the FRAND obligation formally appeared in the “An-
nouncement of the Standardization Administration of China and the State 
Intellectual Property Office on Issuing the Interim Provisions on the Ad-
ministration of National Standards Involving Patents” and became a re-
quired obligation for any Chinese national standard involving patents. 
 11.  See Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools:A Century of Policy Evolution, 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3,  2004: discussed the anticompetitive effects of weak patents in SSO 
patent pool.   
 12.  Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and 
Competition, issued by THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION (April, 2007), P.37-P.40 
 13.  Shenzhongfazhiminchuzi No. 858 (2011);˄2011˅␡ѝ⌅⸕≁ࡍᆇㅜ 858 ਧ ;
yuegaofaminsanzhongzi no.306 (2013) ;(2013)㋔儈⌅≁й㓸ᆇㅜ 306ਧ
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In 2015, a 16.6 billion -USD dollar merger proposed by Nokia to 
Acatel Lucent, both holding SEP of wireless communication standard, 
again invited the Chinese government’s antitrust scrutiny.  The Ministry 
of Commerce of People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM) reviewed the 
merger and analyzed the potential concentration effects on the market.  As 
consistently emphasized by the FTC, the MOFCOM also required Nokia 
to commit to the FRAND obligation since the mechanism may ameliorate 
the anticompetitive effect of SEP license market concentrations. 
Once again in 2016, Qualcomm’s SEP license practice in wireless 
communication license market raised antitrust concerns. National Devel-
opment and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of Chinaġ
(NDRC) sanctioned Qualcomm approximate USD 1,000,000,000 (RMB 6 
billion) for the abuse of its dominant position in China’s CDMA, 
WCDMA, and LTE SEP license markets.14
This SEP antitrust issue seems to continuously draw the attentions of 
China’s administrative agencies.  Perhaps it is because of the influence and 
the complexity of the SSO standard, billion-dollar penalty, or because in-
fringement damages usually occur when SSO’s SEP is involved. No gov-
ernmental authorities, China and the US, can afford to ignore potential 
anti-competitive effects. 
Because hijacking of SSO patents is considered one of the worst sit-
uations for consumers, a situation which China’s anti-monopoly law 
(AML) aims to protect, a study from consumers’ perspective for a review 
of Chinese antitrust developing mechanism, a result of its enforcement, 
and the appropriateness of relevant regulations on SSO’s patent pooling 
arrangements shall be necessary. This study summarized the recent Chi-
nese antitrust enforcements and reviewed from consumer’s perspective as 
will be discussed later. 
C. The Incorporation of Patent Misuse Doctrine in Antitrust 
Enforcement and a Review on US Antitrust Law 
China’s AML enforcement authorities have continuously empha-
sized the importance of the FRAND and disclosure obligations since its 
first SEP case in the IDC Court in 2013, and have reiterated it in Microsoft, 
Nokia, and Qualcomm decisions made by administrative agencies. 
 14.  The 6 billion RMB sanction on QUALCOMM by NDRC, ഭᇦਁኅ᭩䶙ငሩ儈䙊ޜ
ਨපᯝ㹼Ѫ䍓Ԕᮤ᭩ᒦ㖊Ⅾ 60ӯݳ http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwfb/201502/t20150210 
_663822.html  access 05/25 2016  
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Nevertheless, the recent Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on Abuse of In-
tellectual Property Rights (Draft for Comment) issued by the NDRC, con-
trary to previous administrative decisions, does not specifically illicit the 
FRAND and disclosure obligations. 
US American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) com-
mented15 on the guideline, and reiterated the importance of using FRAND
licensing terms to provide the balance between the SSO’s contributors’ 
incentives to invest in R&D and the implementers’ access to technologies 
under reasonable terms.  The AIPLA criticized the guideline for not ad-
dressing whether the antitrust law or contract law should intervene if the 
SEP holders fail the FRAND commitment. 
The US-China Business Council (USCBC), although generally 
agreed with the consideration of pro-competitive effect by China’s agen-
cies under the guideline, also suggested an elimination of “the clean cut” 
analysis on the differential treatment evaluation caused by SEP holders’ 
abusing their dominant positions.16
Because at least one of the comments relating to injunction remedy 
is in direct contradiction with the US law, this study includes a review on 
the US antitrust law to verify if the comments are biased. 
The literature review finds the USCBC’s position is consistent with 
the US law, but AIPLA’s position may be debatable.  It also finds the use 
of patent misuse doctrine FRAND, as promulgated by the AIPLA, is not 
without controversy. Rather, a contradictory development of the US anti-
trust law, i.e., the court’s requirement for finding of the patent misuse con-
duct in proving the antitrust violation,17 is not consistent with the law al-
most enacted by the Congress.18
D. The Use of Economic Theories to Resolve Legal Issues 
In order to determine whether the patent misuse doctrine is an appro-
priate standard for antitrust review and resolve legal disputes, this study 
resorts to economic theories. 
 15. http://www.aipla.org/advocacy/intl/Docu-
ments/AIPLA%20Comments%20on%20NDRC%20%202%209%2015%20%20FINAL.pdf  
access 05/25 2016 
 16. https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/USCBC%20Comments%20on% 
20State%20Council%20Antimonopoly%20Commission%20Draft%20Antimonop-
oly%20Guidelines%20on%20Abuse%20of%20IPR%20-%20Chinese.pdf access 05/25 2016 
 17.  See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, p.5, (2006):”it would be absurd 
to assume that Congress intended to provide that the use of a patent that merited punishment as 
a felony under the Sherman Act would not constitute “misuse.”“
 18.  Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act, S. Res. 1595 100th Cong. §438 : which 
requires finding antitrust violation as a precondition before finding patent misuse. 
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While many papers on economics focus on the importance of com-
plementary pooling, few papers discuss the influence of patent pool on 
manufacture quantities, which directly affect consumer surplus — show-
ing why this is one of the major legitimate reason to apply antitrust penalty 
on firms under both Chinese and US laws.19  Additionally, the distinct in-
terests of “Product-Centric Developers” and “Patent-Centric Developer,”
although they have been recognized by at least one legal scholar,20 are sel-
dom put together to simulate the SSO’s negotiation process.
Following a review of various literatures, an economic model revised 
from traditional models to reflect two competing interests, Product-Cen-
tric Developers’ and Patent-Centric Developer’s interests, is introduced to 
evaluate the societal effect of the FRAND and Disclosure rule. The model 
focuses on analyzing whether the consumer surplus is enhanced by SSO’s
SEP, i.e., whether the benefit outweighs its adverse effect in corresponding 
to the rule of reason standard (ROR) for reviewing patent pool arrange-
ment by courts. 
The calculation result resolves the dilemma of the recent controver-
sial rulings, and demonstrates that the court’s ruling, which found the pa-
tent misuse conduct as one of elements to prove the antitrust violation in 
patent pooling case,21 is logically sound compared to the legislator’s bill—
Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act.22 The result also points out 
that the comments provided by the USCBC and part of the AIPLA’s com-
ments are beneficial to consumers. 
II.   THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S ANTITRUST 
REGULATIONS ON SSO’S PATENT POOLING 
A. The Change of China’s Sentiment on SSO’s Patent Pools 
China’s sentiment against patent system is best reflected by its once 
prosperous DVD industry.  The Chinese DVD industry had 90% market 
share worldwide in 2002, but 79% of the companies soon went bankrupt 
 19.  See Chinese AML article I.  ShouWen Zhang, Economic Law 2nd edition, p. 241 Beijing: 
Renmin University Press, 2012.  Also, Russell Pittman, Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate 
Standard for Antitrust Enforcement, EAG Discussion Papers, EAG 07-9, June 2007. Also see 
Robert H. Lande and Neil W. Averitt , Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust 
and Consumer Protection Law Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 65, p. 713, 1997: demonstrate both 
antitrust law and consumer protection law ensure the consumers to enjoy the fruit of competition.  
 20.  Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards And Ex Ante Disclosure: Results And Analy-
sis of An Empirical Study, American Bar Association Jurimetrics Winter, 53 Jurimetrics J. 163 
2013. 
 21.  see Princo Corp. v. International Trade Com’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010): re-
quired conducts hurting competition and patent misuse by patentee to prove antitrust violations 
 22.  S. Res. 1595 100th Cong. §438 
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after facing serious SEP patent infringement lawsuit by DVD SEP hold-
ers.23 This DVD SEP wiped out almost the entire DVD industry in China 
and caused a fury against the “US patent litigation imperialism.”.  Subse-
quently, China passed its antitrust law in 2008, and this was considered as 
one of the more effective tool to prevent dominant foreign companies from 
abusing dominant positions when enforcing their rights of SEP in China.  
The antagonism against the enforcement of SSO’s patent rights, however, 
has gradually and tremendously changed in recent years. 
In 2011, China spent $208 billion on R&D, compared to USÿs $429 
billion and Japanÿs $146 billion. Furthermore, its share of the worldÿs
R&D investment constituent increased from 14 percent to 15 percent.24
China has now become one of the most dynamic innovation-driven econ-
omies in the world.  The number of domestic patent applications increased 
three times from 112,088 in 2002 to 293,066 in 2010.25
For the purpose of further boosting its industry toward advanced 
modern economy, Chinese government has repeatedly reinforced its pol-
icy of encouraging innovation and emphasizing the importance of protect-
ing intellectual property right.  In December 2015, the State Council issued 
“Opinion on Accelerating the Building of IP power under New Condi-
tions”26 (the Opinion) to encourage innovation, improve intellectual prop-
erty right (IPR) protection mechanism, and increase IP infringement pen-
alties.  More specifically, the Opinion provides five major measures to 
achieve its IP strategy: promoting reform in IP administration system and 
mechanism, carrying its rigid IP protection, promoting IP creation and uti-
lization, strengthening overseas IP layout and risk prevention in key in-
dustries, enhancing international cooperation level.27
While recognizing the importance of IP rights, the Chinese govern-
ment also noticed the anticompetitive nature of SSO’s SEP patents.  The 
Opinion protects domestic Chinese industry from SEP patent misuse, and 
requires lower-level administrative agencies to fully develop antitrust 
 23.  http://www.sipo.gov.cn/ztzl/zxhd/ggkf/bdpl/hg/200812/t20081218_430596.html ac-
cess 05/25, 2016 
 24.  Comparing with a dropp from 37 percent to 30 percent in US, from 26 percent to 22 
percent in Europe 
https://www.nsf.gov/nsb/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=130380 access 05/25 2016 
 25.  The statistic report by SIPO, available at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/tjxx/ access 05/25, 
2016 
 26.  Editor-in-Chief: Wu Hui, China vows to speed up building an IP Power,China Report 
Intellectual Property, Dec 30, 2015 available at http://english.sipo.gov.cn/news/Chi-
naIPNews/2015/201512/P020151230397526248167.pdf access 05/25 2016 or  
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/wzly/zcfg/201512/t20151231_770069.html  access 05/25 2016  
 27.  Id.
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guidelines.  To be more specific, it instructs lower-level administrative 
agencies to incorporate the FRAND rule to prevent patent misuse when 
formulating antitrust guidelines, and to apply the FRAND rule to supervise 
the SEP right enforcement in China. 
From policy makers’ perspective, the Chinese and US governments 
are quite similar when facing the SSO’s SEP issue.  Both governments 
share the general idea that SSO’s patent pool may help reduce transac-
tional cost for IP license and improve R&D efficiency, but they also have 
concerns about the anticompetitive effect being augmented via an influen-
tial industrial standard.  The well-functioning policy must have an antitrust 
mechanism to control and prevent the SEP patent holdup problems, but 
the mechanism must not discourage the formation of SSO’s patent pools. 
The next session discusses Chinese government’s efforts to encourage 
SSO’s patent pooling arrangement and promote mechanisms that limit an-
ticompetitive effect.  In general, implementing SSO’s patent pool for-
mation with mandatory FRAND and disclosure obligations is believed to 
be the most appropriate path. 
B. Chinese CourtsȽAntitrust Enforcement and the FRAND 
Obligation on SEP Holders: IDC v. Huawei
The ruling of the Shenzhen Court on the IDC case in 2013 predates 
the Opinion.  The court recognized the precompetitive effect embedded in 
SSO’s nature that may enhance product interoperability, reduce produc-
tion cost and replacement cost, protect consumer welfares, and promote 
innovation.
The court’s opinion delineated that the SEP holder in 3G standard 
possesses power to hinder or affect the entry of other business operators 
into the market because any 3G SEP patent is a necessary patent without 
alternative substitutes in the market.  The court held that the 3G SEP patent 
holder has dominant position under AML Article 17.28  The court also 
found that IDC’ abused its dominant position when it committed FRAND 
to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). IDC vi-
olated the FRAND requirement by charging Huawei a higher royalty rate 
than Apple and Samsung. The unofficial information indicated IDC could 
 28.  AML article 17: “For the purposes of this Law, market dominant position shall mean 
the market position that gives a business operator the power to control product pricing. . .the 
power to hinder or affect the entry of other business operators into the relevant market.”
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have charged Huawei 10 times higher than Apple.29 IDC required a man-
datory grant back clause in the license agreement, which violated AML.30
In addition, the injunction remedy sought by the IDC in the US Interna-
tional Trade Commission (ITC) was considered to be an improper method 
to impose royalty rates higher than reasonable. 
The Shenzhen Court affirmed the lower court’s sanction of RMB 20 
million and reduced IDC’s final offer royalty rate for Huawei to 0.019% 
after comparing IDC’s offered rate with Samsung and Apple under the 
FRAND term.31
Comparing with the internal instruction received by the Higher Peo-
ple’s Court of Liaoning Province in 2008,32 which required SSO’s member 
to collect zero royalties or at a rate substantially lower than reasonable, the 
FRAND obligation vested by the court in the IDC case is indeed an ad-
vancement for both antitrust law development and IP right protection in 
China. 
In 2015, China’s Supreme Court further issued a new regulation re-
moving the cap on damage awards if a patentee fails to successfully prove 
the damage amount, and the lower court may at its discretion order a dam-
age award by multiplying a reasonable number with the reasonable royalty 
fee previously collected by patentee. 33  A simple utility patent can be 
 29.  http://china.caixin.com/2014-04-17/100666904.htmlˈaccess 05/25 2016 ,  reported 
the 2% final offer by IDC; 2% is 100 times higher than the court’s final decision.  
 30.  IDC also required Huawei to license back all patents, including those not relevant to 
IDC’s technology, for free. 
 31.  see the annual report of Huawei, http://www.huawei.com/ucmf/groups/public/docu-
ments/attachments/hw_u_323372.pdf access 05/25 2016 
 32.  Letter of the Supreme Peopleÿs Court on the Issue of Whether the Exploitation of a 
Patent in the Specification for the Design of Ram-compaction Piles with a Composite Bearing 
Base, an Industry Standard Issued by the Ministry of Construction, by Chaoyang Xingnuo Com-
pany Which Has Conducted Design and Construction according to the Standard Constitutes a
Patent Infringement, No. 4 [2008] of the Supreme People’s Court.ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾᵍ䱣ޤ
绠ޜਨ᤹➗ᔪ䇮䜘亱ਁⲴ豬ъḷ߶ǉ༽ਸ䖭փཟᢙẙ䇮
䇑㿴〻Ǌ䇮䇑ǃᯭᐕ㘼ᇎᯭḷ߶ѝу蝍Ⲵ豬Ѫᱟ੖ᶴᡀץ⣟у蝍ᵳ䰞仈Ⲵ࠭ (2008),≁й
Ԇᆇㅜ 4 ਧ, ǉޣҾᆓᕪǃ瀕䖹оᵍ䱣ᐲޤ澫ᔪㆁᐕ〻ᴹ䲀ޜਨу瀫ץᵳ㓐㓧аṸⲴ䈧
⽪Ǌ
˄2007˅瀑≁ഋ⸕㓸ᆇㅜ 126 ਧ
 33. Decision of the Supreme Peopleÿs Court on Modifying Several Provisions of the Su-
preme Peopleÿs Court on Issues concerning Applicable Laws to the Trial of Patent Controver-
sies (2013), ǉᴶ儎Ӱ≇⌋䲘ީӄᇗ⨼щ࡟㓖㓭ṾԬ䘸⭞⌋ᗁ䰤从Ⲻ㤛ᒨ㿺ᇐɆ, if the in-
fringement damage is uncertain, at the lower courtÿs discretion, it may multiply several times 
of reasonable royalties collected by patentee as the damage award (without 3 times royalty cap). 
If the patentee never license its patent before, the court may resort to 1 million RAMB cap under 
patent law article 65.  http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-13244.html  access 05/25 2016 
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awarded RMB 1 million yuan, which was considered as the cap for inven-
tion patents.34  The new patent law, currently under the public review pro-
cess, also allows treble damages. It also allows the court to order RMB 5 
million yuan damage even when the patentee lacks the ability to produce 
enough evidence proving actual damages.35 The trend obviously favors a 
patentee’s intellectual property right and the FRAND requirement is just 
a limited antitrust obligation on SEP IP right holders. 
C. Administrative Agenciesÿ Antitrust Enforcement 
Developments and New Guidelines Issued for Regulating 
SSO’s Patent Pooling Arrangement 
Under Article 10 of China’s Anti-monopoly Law (AML), the State 
Council is responsible for antitrust enforcement and may authorize its sub-
ordinate agencies to carry out the enforcement.36  Under the State Coun-
cil’s authorization, the NDRC investigates and sanctions price related vi-
olations; the MOFCOM supervises merger or market share concentration 
issue; and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (SAIC) reviews anti-competitive agreements, ob-
serves for abuse of dominant position by a company including all actions 
restricting competition other than price fixing.37
Initially, Antitrust Law does not apply to IP right holders unless they 
abuse IP rights to exclude or limit competition Article 55.38  The law does 
not specify what constitutes IPR abuse, not to mention using the FRAND 
as the mechanism to prevent IPR abuse.  In the absence of a clear definition, 
SSO’s SEP license practice therefore never raised antitrust concerns until 
 34. A ruling related to utility patent dispute by Shanghai Higher Court ୖᾏ㧗㝔⮡ᶨ崟⭆
䓐㕘✳ᶻ⇑㛫么也ἄ↢ἲᐃ᭱㧗㔠桅峼‧⇌⅛ , http://www.chinacourt.org/article/de-
tail/2016/04/id/1844897.shtml access 05/25 2016 
 35.  Article 68 of “the Revised Draft of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(Draft for Review) “; ࠓ୰⋶Ṣ㮹ℙ␴⚥ᶻ⇑㱽ᾖ孊勱㟰炷復⭉䧧炸˫℔⺨⼩㯪シ奩䘬忂
䞍
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/cazjgg/201512/20151200479591.shtml  access 05/25 2016 
 36.  Article 10 of Anti-Monopoly Law: “The agencies undertaking the duties of anti-mo-
nopoly law enforcement as appointed by the State Council. . .shall carry out anti-monopoly law 
enforcement tasks in accordance with the provisions of this Law. “   
 37.  Liu Ning Yuan, Introduction, Liu Ning Yuan, ed., A study of Chinese Antitrust Law 
Enforcement from competition law’s perspective, Beijing, 2015, law press Chinaˈp.7  
 38.  Article 55 : “With respect to business operators’ acts of exercising intellectual property 
rights according to the provisions of laws and administrative regulations, this Law shall not 
apply; however, with respect to business operators’ acts of abusing intellectual property rights 
to exclude or limit competition, this Law shall apply.”
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the IDC v. Huawei, and this is the case in which is the FRAND is men-
tioned officially for the first time. 
In 2015, China’s AML experienced rapid changes in antitrust en-
forcement and SEP antitrust regulations. In February, the NDRC set a rec-
ord-high antitrust penalty against Qualcomm’s license practice.39  In Au-
gust, perhaps spiked by the NDRC, the SAIC began to prepare antitrust 
guidelines and solicited public comments as discussed below. In October, 
the MOFCOM issued a conditional clearance decision and concluded the 
FRAND and Disclosure rules as the mechanism to prevent the potential 
abuse of SEPs after Nokia’s US 1 billion dollar acquisition.40 On the last 
day of 2015, the NDRC further published a draft of antitrust guideline to 
solicit the comments on regulating IPR abuse by antitrust law, and it was 
expected to be officially submitted to the State Council for approval in the 
middle of year 2016.41  Contrary to the MOFCOM, SAIC, or NDRC’s pre-
vious antitrust enforcement, the guideline does not emphasize the FRAND 
or Disclosure rules as the mechanism to prevent SEP abuse as will be dis-
cussed later. 
Due to the rapid change of antitrust enforcement, a more detailed re-
view on the recent enforcement by China’s administrative agencies is sum-
marized below: 
1. MOFCOM’s Antitrust Enforcement on SEP Issues 
In 2014, the MOFOCOM reviewed Microsoft’s acquisition of Nokia 
Device & Services and issued a clearance with conditions for both par-
ties.42  The MOFCOM first identified three relevant markets that may be 
affected by the merger: the smartphone device market, the operation sys-
tem for smartphone device, and the patent license market related to the 
device. The MOFOCOM found the market shares for Microsoft OS and 
 39.  The 6 billion RMB sanction on QUALCOMM by NDRC, ഭᇦਁኅ᭩䶙ငሩ儈䙊ޜ
ਨපᯝ㹼Ѫ
䍓 Ԕ ᮤ ᭩ ᒦ 㖊 Ⅾ 60 ӯ ݳ http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwfb/201502/t20150210 
_663822.html  access 05/25 2016 
 40.  http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201510/20151001139743.shtml  access 05/25 
2016 
41.  Submitting antitrust guidelines for enforcement related to IP, Xinhua Net, Jan 4th, 2016  
⸕ 䇶 ӗ ᵳ ৽ ප ᯝ ᤷ ই к ॺ ᒤ ᨀ Ӕ ഭ ࣑ 䲒 ˈ ᯠ ॾ 㖁 , 1 ᴸ 4 ᰕ ,2016 ˈ
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-01/04/c_128591139.htm  access 05/25 2016 
 42.  Announcement No. 24 [2014]㸪the Ministry of Commerce Announcement on Ap-
proval of Additional Restrictive Conditions in the Anti-monopoly Review Decision ReMarket 
Concentration in the Acquisition of the Equipment and Service Business of Nokia Corp.by Mi-
crosoft Inc. ၟ≉悐℔⏲ 2014ᖺ➨ 24ྕයன㝃ຍ㝈ไᛶ᮲௳ᢈ෸ᚤ弗㓞峕客➢Ṃ学⢯␴
㚵≉᷂≉㟰乷反侭普ᷕ⍵✬㕕⭉㞍⅛⭂䘬℔⏲
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201404/20140400542415.shtml  access 05/25 2016 
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Nokia OS were 1.2% and 3.7% respectively in China and 2.42% and 
4.85% in the global market.  For a reason that competition nature in OS 
systems substantially depended on the user’s evaluation and loyalty to the 
embedded application but not the OS systems itself, both companies could 
not refuse to license, raise royalty rates, or block the OS with discrimina-
tory treatment.  Therefore, Microsoft and Nokia did not possess dominant 
position in the OS market. 
Microsoftÿ SEP and non-essential patents related to 802.11 Wi-Fi, 
H.264 3G/4G/LTE standards for Android smartphone, however, may con-
stitute dominant position in the license market because the patents are nec-
essary constituent for producing Android OS, and 80% of China’s
smartphones use Android OS.  Because 90% of Chinese manufacturers do 
not have capabilities to bargain and negotiate a cross license with the 
merged company, and because the SEP license is the major barrier for 
market entry, the raise of royalty rate by Microsoft may either force man-
ufacturers to close (adversely impacting competitions) or perfuse the ad-
ditional cost to consumers (harming consumers), and this kind of abuse of 
SEP rights may harm China’s Market. 
In addition, the de facto existence of SEP may substantially limit the 
competition in alternative technology developments.  If the SEP holder 
abuses its rights, such as refusing to license, charging higher royalty rate 
than the legitimate, or discriminatory license, the competition structure of 
the market may be twisted. Nokia as the owner of thousands of SEP in the 
communication device market should not abuse its rights in the SEP li-
censing market of communication device. 
The condition for the clearance therefore required both companies to 
continue license SEP patents under the FRAND as their commitment to 
the SSO.  Conditions imposed by MOFCOM for Microsoft include: Mi-
crosoft shall not resort to injunction when enforcing the SEP rights against 
Chinese manufacturers, not require grant back clause unless the licensee 
also possesses SEP, and not assign SEP rights unless the assignee agrees 
to the FRAND commitments. 
Likewise, conditions imposed by MOFCOM for Nokia include: 
Nokia shall not resort to injunction when enforcing the SEP rights under 
the FRAND obligation unless the licensee does not accept the FRAND 
term in good faith.  The MOFCOM also described the good faith recog-
nized by Nokia as: the dispute can be resolved by arbitration, and the li-
cense is bound by the result to pay royalties under the FRAND term with-
out delay.  The FRAND license term should not force licensee to accept 
other patent license term without FRAND obligations.  Nokia shall not 
assign SEP rights unless the assignee agrees to FRAND commitments.  
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Nokia provided roughly 9 factors to determine its SEP FRAND rates and 
agreed no substantial deviation from it. 
In October 2015, The MOFCOM further reviewed a US 16.6 billion 
USD merger proposed by Nokia to Acatel Lucent and issued a clearance 
with conditions related to the license of wireless communication SEP.  In 
its 7000-word decision, the MOFCOM used a third party’s market share 
report to analyze the competition effect by the concentration.43  In the con-
ditional clearance, the MOFCOM specified that the merger would not sub-
stantially limits wireless infrastructure equipment competition because 
ZTE, Huawei, and Ericsson still actively compete in the 2G, 3G, or 4G 
equipment market.  The MOFCOM, however, was concerned that the mer-
ger may limit the SEP licensing market because Nokia would hold 35% of 
SEP patents in the market after the merger.  Therefore, the conditions for 
the clearance required Nokia to agree on licensing its SEP patents to all 
licensees under the FRAND term and act as a good faith licensor when 
negotiating. 
It is quite apparent that both decisions by the MOFCOM highly relied 
on the FRAND obligation to mitigate the SEP right abuse.  The MOFCOM 
did not interfere with the SEP holderÿs calculation on reasonable rates in 
both opinions for the moment, but the nine calculation factors provided by 
NOKIA hinted that the MOFCOM had asked for the calculation base. 
2. The State Administration for Industry and Commerce of the 
People’s Republic of China (SAIC) 
In August 2015, another administrative agency SAIC issued antitrust 
provisions on prohibitingĀthe Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to 
Preclude or Restrict Competition,āand the provisions are expected to pro-
tect the rights of IP rights holders while promoting innovation and pre-
serving market competition.44 As mentioned, the FRAND obligation and 
Disclosure rules of patent misuse doctrine is believed to be the means to 
achieve the goal. 
Particularly, the provision45 of Article 13 requires that: An operator 
shall not use the formulation and implementation of the standards . . .to 
 43.  http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201510/20151001139743.shtml, access 05/25 
2016 
 44.  Provisions of the State Administrative for Industry and Commerce on prohibiting the 
Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Preclude or Restrict Competition 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/zyfb/zjl/fld/201504/t20150413_155103.html  access 05/25 2016 
 45.  English version reference: http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=25eefb9e-
404d-4ac5-b704-4a5672330f95  access 05/25 2016 
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exclude or restrict competition in exercising intellectual property rights. 
An operator who is of dominant market position may not. . . implement . . . 
excluding or restricting competition in the course of formulation and im-
plementation of the standards: 
i. when participating in the formulation of the standards, delib-
erately not disclosing information on its rights to the stand-
ards setting organization, or explicitly waiving its rights, but 
claiming its patent rights to the implementers of a standard 
after the standard involves the patent. 
ii. after the patent has become an essential patent of the stand-
ards, in violation of the fair, reasonable and non-discrimina-
tory principles, implementing denial of license, conducting 
tied sale of products, adding other unreasonable trading con-
ditions in the transaction or implementing other acts of ex-
cluding or restrict competition. 
The provision also prohibits some SSO’s patent pooling conducts 
when SSO’s members have a dominant position.46 The restrictions are not 
quite different from conducts prohibited under US law as will be discussed 
later in this article. 
The provisions, however, do not specify what constitutes IP holder’s 
dominant position in the market. If an SSO’s SEP holder’s dominant po-
sition is presumed, as the court did in IDC v. Huawei,  Article 13 essen-
tially requires all SEP holders to follow the FRAND obligations even if 
they do not participate in the formation of the standard or not commit to 
the FRAND.  In addition, SSO’s members’ violation of the FRAND and 
Disclosure rule may be considered as a behavior that “exclude or restrict 
competition in exercising intellectual property rights.”
On November 25, 2015, the SAIC further publicly welcomed com-
ments on its sixth draft of the “Antitrust Guideline on Intellectual Property 
Rights Abuses Anti-monopoly and Anti-unfair Competition Enforcement 
Bureau of State Administration for Industry & Commerce.”47  This new 
provision, which was finalized four months after the August provision, 
 46.  See Article 12: The provision prohibits members of SSO’s Patent pool member when 
having a dominant position from: Restricting independent licensing; constraining the members 
of patent pool or licensees to research and develop and to compete with the parent pool; forcing 
the licensees to exclusively grant back the improved technologies to the members of patent pool; 
prohibiting the licensees from challenging patent validity of the pool; treating licensee or the 
members of patent pool with the same conditions discriminatorily; and exercise other conducts 
of abusing dominant market position. 
 47.  http://www.saic.gov.cn/fldyfbzdjz/gzdt/201601/W020160108580399473419.pdf  ac-
cess 05/25 2016 
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clearly instructed that a SEP holder should not be presumed to have a dom-
inant position in the market, and the antitrust determination shall be based 
upon observing effects on competition. 48  In this new provision, the 
FRAND obligation and Disclosure rule are merely a reference for analyz-
ing relevant monopolistic conduct but not a mandatory obligation.  In ad-
dition, analysis on SEP holder’s market position shall be the same as ordi-
nary IP holders and similar general analysis framework shall be applied to 
determine market dominance under the AML. 
Based on a proposed economic calculation as will be discussed later 
in this article, this new November antitrust guideline reflects a timely re-
vision correcting the potential mistakes in the August provision. 
3. The Development of NDRC’s Antitrust Enforcement on SEP 
Issues
The NDRC, similar to the MOFCOM and the SAIC, adopted the 
FRAND initially but it seems to have changed its attitude on incorporating 
the FRAND doctrine for antitrust review in its most recent guideline.  Prior 
to discussing the guideline drafted by the NDRC in December 2015, this 
study must introduce the high-profiled 1-billion-penalty USD decision on 
Qualcomm’s abusing SEP license in the wireless telecommunications in-
dustry in February 2015. 
From NDRC’s earlier perspective, what constitutes antitrust violation 
may be understood by the Qualcomm decision.  According to the deci-
sion,49 the evidence showed Qualcomm possessed a dominant position in 
the CDMA, WCDMA, and LTE SEP markets. Unlike the market share 
analysis done by the MOFCOM, no explanation was given as to what ev-
idence constituted the dominant position. 
Qualcomm was accused of abusing the dominant position by charg-
ing a license fee higher than it should have obtained, of tying unnecessary 
and expired patents, and of attaching unreasonable condition when selling 
its chips. 
 48.  Id. at article 4 and article 29.  “a patent holder should not be directly presumed to have 
market dominance in the relevant market solely because of owning the SEP. ..the identification 
of a SEP’s market position should be based on. . .on the influence that the SEP’s relevant char-
acteristics . . . the competition between different technical standards and the basic status of the 
technical standards.”  If the market share is small, the SEP holder does not have market domi-
nance.  Otherwise, the following factors should be considered: “the substitutability of the stand-
ard and the patented technologies; the evolution and compatibility of the standard and its influ-
ence; the possibility and difficulty of switching to other technical standards by implementers of 
the standard and other relevant factors that should be considered.”
 49.  see footnote 39, Ibid. 
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Regarding the charge of unfairly high royalty rates, the decision was 
based on Qualcomm’s refusal to provide the patent list to its licensee, re-
quiring free grant back, and calculated royalties based on the entire device 
value instead of the SEP related chipset value. 
For the charge of tying unnecessary and expired patents, the licensee 
was compelled to accept a package of unnecessary license tying with the 
SEP.
For the charge of attaching unreasonable conditions, the licensee 
seemed to have been forced to agree on the non-challenge clause. 
During the investigation, Qualcomm “voluntarily” changed its busi-
ness practices during the investigation with following actions: 1) charged 
royalty rates at 65% of the wholesale net selling price of the device, 2) 
provided the patent list for potential licensees and the list shall not include 
expired patents 3) canceled free grant-back clauses, 4˅ended a practice 
of tying unnecessary patents to SEP license, 5) discontinued unreasonable 
tie-in sales and rescind the non-challenge clause with the Chinese licensee. 
Due to the voluntarily change, the NDRC in the decision publicly 
welcomed Qualcomm’s continuing investment in China and promised to 
support the royalty collection in China with the royalty rates.  It appeared 
that as long as Qualcomm is committed to FRAND practice, the royalty 
rate could be decided by market and freely negotiated by the licensee and 
Qualcomm. 
It is fair to conclude that the purpose of the NDRC’s decision was to 
maintain the market order, rather than to instruct a particular “FRAND” 
rate for a SEP’s license agreement.  The FRAND seemed an implicit obli-
gation for SEP holders.  The decision also shed some lights on the NDRC’s
self-control of its power, allowing the market to decide reasonable rates.  
Despite the fact that the Qualcomm case demonstrated a huge advance-
ment in the NDRC’s antitrust enforcement, it remains a mystery as to how 
the NDRC determined Qualcomm’s dominant position and came up with 
the 8% of the annual revenue as a reasonable penalty. 
4. The Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on Abuse of Intellectual 
Property Rights (Draft for Comment) 
Several months after the Qualcomm decision and several days after 
the Opinion by the State Council, the NDRC conformed to the State Coun-
cil’s plan, and issued Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on Abuse of Intellectual 
Property Rights (Draft for Comment).50  The guideline is expected to be 
 50.  http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/fjgld/201512/t20151231_770233.html? access 05/25 2016 
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officially submitted to the State Council for approval in the second half of 
year 2016 and is currently published on NDRC’s website for public re-
view.51
Contrary to the Opinion and the Qualcomm decision, the draft guide-
line does not include the FRAND or Disclosure rules for SEP’s antitrust 
review.  The tentative antitrust guideline (without patent misuse) chooses 
a different analysis path when regulating SSO’s SEP IP right abuse mat-
ters. The provision distinguishes the antitrust suspicious contents in IP 
agreements and the abuse of dominant positions by IP holders in two dif-
ferent categories.  The contents relevant to SSO’s SEP antitrust enforce-
ment are summarized as below: 
i. A review of IP related agreements: 
Agencies shall determine if operators are in competitive positions or 
not. 
When an operator is in a competitive position, agencies takes follow-
ing factors into consideration: 
1. R&D joint agreement: whether a restriction affects independ-
ent R&D activities beyond the scope of the technology of the 
joint R&D; whether the joint agreement limits corporations 
to develop technology with other third parties; whether the 
joint R&D agreement limits IPR enforcement not relevant to 
the technology developed by the R&D joint venture. 
2. Patent Pool consortium agreement: whether the pool mainly 
consists of complimentary or substitute patents; whether the 
consortium allows members to license IP independently; 
whether it excludes alternative technologies or creates mar-
ket entry barriers for other competitors;  whether members 
exchange antitrust sensitive information such as price, capac-
ity, market division, or information not necessary to form the 
consortium; whether the consortium limits members’ activi-
ties in developing new technologies. 
3. Cross license agreement: whether the agreement is exclusive 
in nature, creates entrance barrier for a third party into rele-
vant markets, or impedes downstream market competition. 
4. Standard Formation agreement: whether the formation ex-
cludes any specific operators, excludes particular proposals 
by a specific operator, prohibits the implementation of other 
English translation: http://www.ipkey.org/en/ip-law-document/item/3832-anti-monopoly-
guideline-on-intellectual-property-abuse access 05/25 2016  
 51.  http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/fjgld/201512/t20151231_770233.html access 05/25 2016 and  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-01/04/c_128591139.htm, access 05/25 2016 
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standards, or causes necessary and reasonable mechanism to 
restrict IP right enforcement related to the standard. 
It appears that the NDRC was concerned about technology competi-
tions affected by R&D JV and the downstream market competition af-
fected by a cross license.  When it comes to standard formation and patent 
pool, the agency focused more on market order and fairness: such as fair 
opportunities for SSO’s members to participate, fairness for IP holders to 
compete, fairly compete with other standards. . .etc. 
When operators are not in competitive positions against each other, 
the agency contemplates if an agreement involves price fixing, exclusive 
grant back, forcing licensee to agree on no challenge clause or other ac-
tions that may raise antitrust concerns. 
The new provision also provides a “safe harbor” for antitrust. If the 
market share of the operators is fewer than 15% or 25% of the operators 
not in competition, the IP holder agreement is presumed legitimate unless 
the agreement violates Articles 13 and 14 of the AML.52  Comparing the 
provision with Article 19 of the AMLˈthis new provision allows addi-
tional 5% market share concentration for any IP holders and additional 
15% if the IP holders are not in a competition position.53
ii. IP holders commit the abuse of dominant positions 
The agency concerns different factors when an IP holder commits an 
abuse of dominant positions via IP rights.  Unlike the court’s analysis in 
IDC v. Huawei, IP or SEP right holders are not presumed to have market 
power or dominant position in the market.  The agency shall follow the 
factors and the analysis framework under the AML, but it may further con-
sider additional factors when an IP holder’s dominant position is con-
cerned. 
1. Dominant position 
The factors in determining IP holders’ dominant positions include: 
The alternative cost for switching to other IP rights; the reliance of down-
stream markets on the products involving the IP at issue; and the counter-
part dealer’s ability to bargain. 
When SEP is a concern, additional factors may be considered: The 
value of the standard and its application in the market; the existence of 
alternative standards, industrial reliance on the standard and the switching 
 52.  Noting that the market share safe harbor is 20% for competitor and 30% for non-com-
petitor respectively under the antitrust enforcement provisions issued by SAIC on August 2015.  
 53.  Comparing with article 19, AML: “if a certain business operator therein holds less than 
ten percent of the market shares, that business operator shall not be deemed to hold a market 
dominant position.”
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cost of alternative standards; the development and compatibility of differ-
ent generation standards; the possibility of adopting alternative technolo-
gies in the standard; and whether the SEP right holder has resorted to in-
junction as a remedy. 
2. The abuse of dominant positions 
If an IP or SEP holder is deemed to have a dominant position, the 
following behaviors may constitute an antitrust violation: demanding un-
reasonably high royalty rates, refusing to license, tying and attaching un-
reasonable conditions in deal, and engaging in differential treatments to its 
licensees.  The guideline notes that: 
For royalty rates, an IP right holder is entitled to collect royalties as 
incentives for its invention. The right holder with a dominant position, 
however, cannot collect the royalty at a rate that may restrict competition 
or harm consumers. 
In regard to right to refuse a license, an IP right holder is free to do 
so, but the holder with a dominant position may not refuse to license with-
out legitimate reasons. 
In the aspect of tying, it may be a pro-competitive behavior because 
it reduces transactional costs. However, tying may be anti-competitive if 
it is against the will of a counterparty; against business customs; it disre-
gards relevance between a tied product and the IP related products; the 
practice is unnecessary for product compatibility, safety, or performance; 
and it restricts other operators’ dealing opportunities. 
Regarding the differential treatment, an IP right holder has a right to 
treat a licensee differently, but a dominant right holder cannot treat a li-
censee with essentially similar condition differently. Other factors may in-
clude: the licensee’s condition, a scope of a license, substitute products 
provided by different licensees, license terms, a nature of business ar-
rangements between a licensor and licensees, and the negative effects on 
a licensee’s participation in a relevant market. 
For using injunction as a remedy, the guideline recognizes injunction 
as a legitimate remedy for SEP right holders, but the injunction order may 
be used to force a licensee to accept unreasonable royalty rates. The 
agency may further consider an actual intent of both parties in the license 
negotiation, including no-injunction commitments of relevant standards, 
offers during the negotiation, and consumers’ interests affected by the in-
junction. 
All the factors in reviewing SEP holders’ behaviors for potential anti-
competitive practices require the agency to consider a pro-competitive na-
ture of IP right holders. Except for the holders’ practices of attaching un-
reasonable conditions, it appears that the guideline lists potential anti-com-
petitive behaviors by dominant SEP holders without considering their pro-
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competitive nature.  The following actions by a dominant SEP holders is 
listed as: requiring the licensee to grant back improvements exclusively, 
precluding the licensee from challenging IP right validity or filing in-
fringement law suit against the licensor, restricting the licensee from using 
competitive technology, asserting expired IP rights, or prohibiting the li-
censee to deal with other third parties.  Such actions by the SEP holders 
with dominant positions, unlike the ordinary IP holders, 54 may invite an-
titrust reviews. 
Due to lack of consideration on the pro-competitive effect, it appears 
that the NDRC may incline to review those actions with rigidity while in-
clining to review other actions under the rule of reason. 
5. The Comments for the Antitrust Guideline from US 
perspective 
Comparing the Chinese guidelines with the Antitrust guidelines is-
sued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) of the United States,55 they 
share a similar standard of review. China’s guidelines require an agency 
to take into account both the pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects 
in most IPR antitrust analysis. However, unlike the FTC guidelines, it does 
not address the FRAND and disclosure obligations.56
The US-China Business Council (USCBC) agrees with few of the 
guidelines, such as considering pro-competitive effect when evaluating 
patent pool consortium agreement. USCBC expressed special concerns on 
“the clean cut” evaluation of holders’ abusing dominant positions under 
differential treatment provision.57  The comment reflects a view of US 
 54.  Noting that the guideline recognize pro-competitive effect of those restrictions by or-
dinary IP holder as shown in its Article II(ii) : 2Falsegrant-back could decrease the risk of licen-
sor, motivate investment . . ., and promote innovation; 3. . . non-assertion clause could prevent 
excessive lawsuits and improve transaction efficiency; 4. . .restricting licensee from using com-
petitive technology or dealing with other third party may be commercially reasonable.   
But when a SEP holder possesses dominant position, no such pro-competitive consideration was 
given.   
 55.  Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 1995, 3.4: “The Agen-
cies’ general approach in analyzing a licensing restraint under the rule of reason is to inquire 
whether the restraint is likely to have anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the restraint is 
reasonably necessary to achieve pro-competitive benefits that outweigh those anticompetitive 
effectsā
 56.  Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights (Draft for Com-
ment), http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/fjgld/201512/t20151231_770233.html? access 05/25 2016 
 57. The comments of USCBC on Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on Abuse of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (Draft for Comment)Jan 20th 2016;⨾୰峠㖻ℐ⚥⥼␀ỂℛḶ⚥≉昊⍵✬㕕⥼␀
Ể ˪ ℛ Ḷ 㺍 䓐 䞍 孮 ṏ 㛫 䘬 ⍵ ✬ 㕕 ㊯ ⋿ ˫ 䘬 ⺢ 孖 , 1 ᴸ 20 ᰕ , 2016; 
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government’s antitrust enforcement agency’s view of using a more lenient 
rule of reason standard (ROR) when reviewing SSO’s SEP antitrust issues 
rather than the per se illegal standard as before. 
The AIPLA criticized several changes of China’s AML enforcement 
by the NDRC, reiterating the importance of SEP patent holders’ legitimate 
rights, and suggesting using the FRAND as the mechanism to prevent 
SEP’s abuse of dominant position.58  The AIPLA casted a doubt on Article 
III(II)(5) Discriminative treatment of the guidelines because a mere differ-
ent rate received by two licensees does not necessarily mean an antitrust 
violation.  In addition, the AIPLA criticized Article III(II)(1) pointing that 
treating license IPR at unfair high royalty as an antitrust violation would 
upset innovators’ interests. It further suggested a clarification on whether 
breaching the FRAND obligation or the seeking of an injunction against 
SEP infringers should on its own constitute an antitrust violation. 
It is unclear whether comments made by the USCBC and the AIPLA 
are biased.  For example, the AIPLA suggested, for the fear of affecting 
IP holders’ legitimate rights, “a breach of a FRAND obligation or the mere 
seeking of an injunction against implementers of an SEP should not on its 
own constitute an antitrust violation.”59 The US courts, contrary to the 
AIPLA’s suggestion, sought to limit the monopoly rights of SEP holders. 
If the patentee commits to FRAND rule under the SSO policy, the patentee 
of the SSO standard can no longer use injunction to prevent others from 
implementing the patented technology.60 Using the injunction remedy pro-
hibited by law during the course of license negotiation is hardly a legiti-
mate enforcement of SEP holders’ rights under US law.  The comments 
contradictory to US law at least demonstrate some of the AIPLA’s com-
ments for China’s guidelines may be biased. 
It is also unclear whether the USCBC’s comments on applying ROR 
review standard or China’s draft guidelines, which preserves the clean cut 
per se evaluation, is more appropriate for antitrust reviews on SEP holders’
https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/USCBC%20Comments%20on%20State% 20Coun-
cil%20Antimonopoly%20Commission%20Draft%20Antimonopoly%20Guide-
lines%20on%20Abuse%20of%20IPR%20-%20Chinese.pdf access 05/25 2016 
 58. Re: AIPLA Comments on State Council Anti-Monopoly Commission’s AntiMonopoly 
Guidelines on Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights (Draft for comment); 
http://www.aipla.org/advocacy/intl/Documents/AIPLA%20Comments%20on%20NDRC 
%20%202%209%2015%20%20FINAL.pdf access 05/25 2016 
 59.  Id.
 60.  Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., Nos. 12-1548, -1549, (Fed. Cir. Apr. 25, 2014), “A pa-
tentee subject to FRAND commitments may have difficulty establishing irreparable harm. On 
the other hand, an injunction may be justified where an infringer unilaterally refuses a FRAND 
royalty or unreasonably delays negotiations to the same effect.”
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conducts.  Furthermore, it remains uncertain whether the FRAND obliga-
tion as promulgated by the AIPLA, adopted by China’s administrative 
agencies earlier, but implicitly skipped in the recent guideline is an appro-
priate mechanism for antitrust enforcement. 
For better understanding of an appropriate antirust legal mechanism 
and to evaluate whether the comments provided by the USCBC and the 
AIPLA are unbiased, the next section reviews the development of Per Se, 
ROR, and patent misuse doctrine for regulating SEP’s anticompetitive be-
haviors under the US law. 
III.   US LEGAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Per Se and Rule of Reason Review on Patent Pool 
In very early cases before 1912, US courts gave patentees relatively 
wide latitude to take advantage of business potential from an invention. 
Collecting royalty by forming a patent pool was one of the options.61  In 
this era, patent law often trumped antitrust law.62
The Supreme Court soon changed its attitude after 1912, and con-
demned patent pooling because it realized that the pool license agreement 
could serve to fix price in the downstream market and reduce competi-
tion.63  With suspicions toward patent pooling, the courts also recognized 
a pro-competitive effect of patent pool and allowed licensing arrangement 
of resale price fixing if a patentee vertically imposed a price restriction on 
its dealer64 or when the patents were blockings65 each other. 
 61.  Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902) is the first patent pooling cases based 
on Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools:A Century of Policy Evolution, STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 3, 2004 (2004).  
 62.  Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. 224 U.S. 1, 224 U. S. 3 (1912):”The patent statute is one cre-
ating and protecting a true monopoly granted to subserve a broad public policy, and it should be 
construed so as to give effect to a wise and beneficial purpose.”
 63.  Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912) “ Before the agree-
ments, the manufacturers of enameled ware were independent and competitive. By the agree-
ments, they were combined, subjected themselves to certain rules and regulations—among oth-
ers, not to sell their product to the jobbers except at a price fixed not by trade and competitive 
conditions.”
 64.  United States v. General Electric Co. et al., 272 U.S. 476 (47 S.Ct. 192, 71 L.Ed. 362), 
(1926). The court upheld a patentee’s license to put a restriction upon his licensee “as to the 
prices at which the latter shall sell articles which he makes and only can make legally under the 
license.”
65.  Standard Oil Company v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931) 
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During the 1930s-1950s, suspicions further escalated and antitrust 
law review standard began to focus on per se rule and market structures.66
SSO’s patent pooling conduct was not an exception to those per se rules.  
Various pooling conducts among horizontal competitors such as price re-
striction,67 territorial allocation,68 and quantity restriction among horizon-
tal competitors,69 as part of a patent licensing agreement, were prohibited.  
The Court was concerned that the pooling arrangements among horizontal 
competitors was a sham mechanism to fulfill the licensor’s anti-competi-
tive goal thus condemned those anti-competitive conducts as “per se ille-
gal.”70
The Court’s scrutiny toward patent pool during this period was 
evinced in the Gypsum case (1948). 71 There, the Court ruled that even a 
vertical price restriction imposed by a patentee was illegal, contrary to its 
ruling 20 years ago which involved similar pooling license conducts.72
From the 1960s to 1980s, the US Supreme Court decisions repeatedly 
dealt with exclusionary practices and the “capture” of an SSO by a group 
of competitors.73
In the 1970s and 1980s, a rigid review on horizontal competitors’ 
conduct under per se rule drew very strong criticism from the Chicago 
School of legal scholars such as Robert Bork and Richard Posner.74  The 
Chicago School scholars proclaimed that the traditional per se illegal con-
ducts, such as vertical restraints, industrial concentration, mergers, and 
contractual restraints, might still have precompetitive effects.75  The ten-
sion between per se rule and rule of reason standards exacerbated in the 
1970s.76  In United States v. Sealy, Inc., the Court held that the vertical 
 66.  Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, William E. Kovacic and 
Carl Shapiro, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 14, Number 1 Winter 2000, Page 49 
 67.  United States v.Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948) 
 68.  United States v. National Lead Co Et Al., 63 F. Supp. 513 (1945) 
 69.  Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945) 
70.  United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952). “When cross-licensing or 
pooling arrangements are mechanisms to accomplish naked price fixing or market division, they 
are subject to challenge under the per se rule.”
 71.  United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) 
 72.  See Supra. General Electric Co. Et Al., 272 U.S. 476, (1926)
 73.  See FTC 2007 report, Antitrust Enforcement And Intelletcual Property Rights:Promot-
ing Innovation and Competition, 2007, P.50, citing Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. 656; Nat’l Soc’y
of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, 456 U.S. 
556; Allied Tube, 486 U.S. 492. 
 74.  William E. Kovacic and Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and 
Legal Thinking, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 14, Page 52, Number 1 Winter 2000   
 75.  Id. at 53. 
 76.  Id.
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restrain of retail prices imposed by a licensor with legally obtained trade-
mark monopoly as illegal per se.77  Yet a few years later in 1977, the US 
Supreme Court in Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., recognized 
the scholars’ opinion, and held that all vertical restrictions, except the very 
sensitive price restriction, should warrant the rule of reason analysis.78
The patent pool cases are no exception to the vigorous debates, but it 
is clear that there has been a gradual shift towards favoring the rule of 
reason analysis.  In Manufacturers Aircraft Ass’n case (1975), the Court 
was still concerned that a pooling agreement tended to diminish incentive 
for individual members to compete for innovation. The Court thus disman-
tled the aircraft patent pool.79  Yet in 1977, the Court, relying on the Con-
tinental T.V. ruling, applied the rule of reason analysis and struck down 
the traditional ruling that all vertical royalty fixing and tying claims were 
subject to per se review.80  Nevertheless, the Court still condemned hori-
zontal cross license agreement since the purpose of the agreement was to 
perpetuate the royalty licensing program as the plaintiff asserted. 
In 1979, the Court ruled that the blanket license of horizontal copy-
right pool was not a per se price fixing violation of the Sherman Act but 
shall be carefully assessed under the rule of reason.81  In 1980, the Court 
reemphasized the pro-competitive effect of patent pool in mitigating a 
“blocking patent” problem, and such legitimate pooling arrangement 
should not be condemned in the absence of anti-competitive purpose or 
effect.82
Since the 1980s, the Court in general held a view that joint ventures 
for patent pools are generally reviewed under the “rule of reason” unless 
they “amount to complete shams.”83 Sharing the view of the Court, the 
 77.  United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, (1967).  
 78.  Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,433 U.S. 36,p.58, (1977 ):” Such re-
strictions, in varying forms, are widely used in our free market economy. As indicated above, 
there is substantial scholarly and judicial authority supporting their economic utility.”
 79.  United State v. Manufacturers Aircraft Ass’n, 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,810 
(S.D.N.Y.1975).  Patent pool can reduce innovative incentives in the concentrated industry with 
high entry barriers.  
80.  Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, (D.S.C. 1977), 
 81.  BROADCAST MUSIC, INC. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, (1979) 
 82.  CARPET SEAMING TAPE LICENSING v. BEST SEAM INC., 616 F.2d 1133, (1980) 
83. Addamax Corp. v.Open Software Found., Inc., 152 F.3d 48, 52 & n.5 (1st Cir. 1998); 
See also, United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34,(D.C. Cir. 2001) rejected to find a package 
license combining”essential” with “nonessential”as per se violation of tying; also see U.S. 
Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1193(Fed. Cir. 2005): “package licensing 
has the procompetitive effect of reducing the degree of uncertainty associated with invest-
ment. . .apply the rule of per se illegality to Philips’s package licensing agreements was legally 
flawed.”
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U.S. antitrust agencies stated conclusively in Intellectual Property Anti-
trust Guidelines published in 1995 that licensing restraints are evaluated 
under the rule of reason approach.84  In one of its public statements, the 
agency said, “policy makers should avoid thinking of antitrust as a tool to 
regulate standard setting efforts, but rather they should analyze standard 
setting practices for specific competitive harms.”85 The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) agency also treated most research joint venture agree-
ments as pro-competitive, and typically analyzed the agreement under the 
rule of reason.86
In 2004, the U.S. Congress enacted the Standards Development Or-
ganization Advancement Act of 2004 (SDOAA), which was amended 
from the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, to 
offer additional antitrust protection for SSO’s standard development ac-
tivities.  The SDOAA specified that “conduct of research joint ventures is 
not deemed illegal per se, but is judged on the basis of its reasonableness, 
taking into account all relevant factors affecting competition.”87  Also, 
Section 211 of the Tunney Act Reform of 2004 requires the courts to con-
sider a competitive impact of a judgment, an impact of entry of such judg-
ment upon competition, and a consideration of the public benefit.88
Recently, the rule of reason analysis for SSO’s patent pool arrange-
ment is further refined into two categories of analysis. On the one hand, if 
the SSO’s conduct is a “naked restraint” that is so plainly anticompetitive 
with no pro-competitive justification,89 the court may apply the “Quick 
Look” rule of reason analysis, and evaluate “only a cursory examination 
to determine the SSO’s antitrust liability” when the per se framework is 
 84.  Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 1995, 3.4: “The Agen-
cies’ general approach in analyzing a licensing restraint under the rule of reason is to inquire 
whether the restraint is likely to have anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the restraint is 
reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that outweigh those anticompetitive 
effects”
 85.  EFFICIENCY IN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST, TANDARD SETTING, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, High-Level Workshop on Standardization, IP Licensing, and 
Antitrust Tilburg Law & Economic Center, Tilburg University Chateau du Lac, Brussels, Bel-
gium, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division U.S. Department of Justice, Janu-
ary 18, 2007. “As a general rule antitrust law should not prohibit practices that make standard 
setting more efficient, because efficiency is good for consumers.”
 86. FTC & Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, § 
3.31(a) at p.14 (2000)  
 87.  15 U.S.C. § 4302 
 88.  See https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-bill/1086 access 05/25 2016 
 89.  Naked restrain is a restrain with no purpose except stifling of competition. See 
BROADCAST MUSIC, INC. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 3 (1979) citing White Motor Co. v. United 
States, 372 U. S. 253, 372 U. S. 263; also Cal. Dental Assÿn v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, (1999)  
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inappropriate.90  Under such analysis, the economic harm is presumed due 
to the questionable nature of the conduct, and the burden is shifted to the 
defendant to show empirical evidence of pro-competitive effects of the 
joint venture to rebut the presumption.91 On the other hand, the court is 
cautious about applying the Quick Look analysis for reviewing SSO con-
ducts because “that presumption of anti-competitiveness shall not be 
lightly invoked.”92
If the standard setting conduct, which may enhance efficiency or 
productivity, falls into the “ancillary restrains” category, the Court may 
apply the rule of reason analysis to determine whether the benefit of the 
conduct outweighs the anti-competitive effect.93
It is clear that the development of recent cases reflect the authorities’ 
more lenient attitudes toward patent pooling, although certain per se vio-
lations remain prohibited under the US antitrust law. The enactment of the 
SDOAA and Tunney Act Reform also demonstrate the same trend. 
B.  Controversial Patent Misuse Standard, FRAND 
Commitment, and Disclosure Requirement 
In recent litigations, the Court recognized the pro-competitive effect 
of SSO under the rule of reason. However, by using the patent misuse doc-
trine, it turned to highlight the patent misuse or the possible patent holdup 
abuse of the standard-patent pool-setting process.94
 90.  See Princo Corp. v. International Trade Com’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010): 
“Quick-look analysis applies to “naked restraint[s] on price and output” where a detailed market 
analysis is unnecessary to conclude that the arrangements in question have anticompetitive ef-
fects” ; AGNEW V. NATȽL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSȽN, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 
2012) 
 91.  “. . .if the joint ventures were a sham, or if the alleged agreement were a naked restraint, 
i.e., not reasonably necessary to achieve the efficiency-enhancing benefits of the joint venture,”
the burden of proof would shift to defendant to show empirical evidence of procompetitive ef-
fects of the joint venture .  See Princo Corp. v. International Trade Com’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) citing Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 338 (2d 
Cir.2008); and California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
 92.  Princo Corp, 616 F.3d 1318, citing Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 8-9, 99 S.Ct. 1551. 
 93. “A restraint is ancillary when it may contribute to the success of a cooperative venture 
that promises greater productivity contribute to the success of restraint is ancillary when it may 
contribute to the success of a cooperative venture that promises greater productivity and output.”
See Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985). When the 
agreement is part of a cooperative venture with prospects for increasing output, it should not be 
condemned as per se illegal. Id. at 190 
 94.  See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, (3d Cir. 2007): a patent holder 
intentionally false promises to license its patent on SDO’s FRAND terms yet breach the promise 
may constitute actionable anti-competitive conduct. “A standard, by definition, eliminates alter-
native technologies.. . .measures such as fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) 
commitments become important safeguards against monopoly power.”
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The patent misuse doctrine, which was originated as early as 1917 by 
a judge, migrated from patent law to antitrust law, and became the review 
standard on patent pool arrangements in the 1940s and the 1950s.95 “The 
basic rule of patent misuse is that the patentee may exploit his patent but 
may not use it to acquire a monopoly not embraced in the patent.”96
Traditionally, the court would consider the existence of a patent mis-
use to determine whether a patentee violated antitrust law.97 Misuse con-
ducts such as obtaining patent by fraud98 or extending a patent monopoly 
beyond a scope permitted by the Congress99 was held illegal per se in the 
early days. 
Similar to the traditional antitrust review, the Court in recent years 
have favored the rule of reason when applying patent misuse doctrine to 
evaluate the patent pool arrangement.100 Despite the relatively lenient an-
titrust review since the year 2000, a patentee as a member of the SSO may 
incur additional obligation when exercising its patent monopoly right in 
the modern era.  For example, the Court may scrutinize on a SSO’s patent 
pool arrangement when a patentee breaches a commitment to license on a 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND), and this commitment 
is relied on by the SSO in deciding the standard.  Violating the FRAND 
commitment can constitute patent misuse and antitrust violations.101  In 
95. Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust: Rebirth or False Dawn?, 20 Mich. Telecomm. 
& Tech. L. Rev. 299, P.315, (2014). citing Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. 
Co., 243 U.S. 502, 502 (1917) as the first case articulated patent misuse and Morton Salt v. G.S. 
Suppiger Co 314 U.S. 488 (1942) as the first Supreme Court case to address both Patent Misuse 
Doctrine and Antitrust competition policy ; See also, United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 400, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948), patents “grant no privilege to their owners 
of organizing the use of those patents to monopolize an industry through price control.”
 96.  Princo Corp. v. International Trade Com’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010) citing 
Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 643, 67 S.Ct. 610, 91 
L.Ed. 563 (1947). 
97.  Cole v. Hughes Tool Company, 215 F.2d 924 (1954) “ The mere accumulation of pa-
tents, no matter how many, is not in and of itself illegal. Of course, there must not be a misuse 
of the patent monopoly” also, see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Ha-zeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 
134-35 (1969) 
 98.  Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 86 S.Ct. 347 
(1965): inquired whether the enforcement of a patent obtained by fraud may be the basis of an 
action under § 2 of the Sherman Act. also see Bendix Corporation v. Balax, INC., 471 F.2d 
149,159 (1972)
 99.  Brulotte v. Thys Co.,379 U.S. 29 (1964):” royalty agreement that projects beyond the 
expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se.”; White Motor Co. v. United States, 83 S.Ct. 696 
(1963):” Where the sale of an unpatented product is tied to a patented article, that is a per se 
violation since it is a bald effort to enlarge the monopoly of the patent beyond its terms.”
100.  U.S. PHILIPS CORP. v. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COM’N, 424 F.3d 1179 (2005), A
patent pool agreement containing non-essential patents does not constitute patent misuse per se 
and shall be reviewed under rule of reason. 
 101.  Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007) 
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another case, In re Rambus (2006), the FTC agency applied the “Disclo-
sure rule” to challenge a “patent ambush” behavior, a behavior which a 
SSO member concealed a relevant patent information during a standard 
formation yet asserted patent claim against firms employing the standard 
at a later time.102
These modern patent misuse obligations, the FRAND and Disclo-
sure, are not without controversy and in fact have attracted criticism from 
scholars.103 The FRAND requirement has been criticized for offering no 
workable definition of fair and reasonable licensing terms.104  As to the 
Disclosure rule requirement, rulings among authorities are still incon-
sistent.  In the Rambus case (2008), the Court ruled that concealing and 
failing to disclose patent itself did not constitute an antitrust violation.105
Yet in another case RIM (2008), factually similar to Rambus, the Court 
held a patentee liable for antitrust violations when it obtained monopoly 
power by misrepresenting to SSOs its intentions to offer FRAND licenses 
yet failed to comply later.106
In addition to the controversy in reality, the application of patent mis-
use doctrine and antitrust violation review may appear to be a dilemma in 
legal analysis.  As mentioned, the Court generally requires evidence for 
patent misuse conduct, such as violation of the FRAND or Disclosure rule, 
to prove antitrust violations under the rule of reason.  Particularly, the 
Court has persuasively argued, “It would be absurd to assume that Con-
gress intended to provide that the use of a patent that merited punishment 
as a felony under the Sherman Act would not constitute ‘misuse’.”107 The 
legislature, however, had intended to enact a law that requires finding an-
titrust violations as a precondition for proving patent misuse.108  Thanks to 
 102.  In re Rambus Inc., FTC Docket No. 9302, p.118-119, (Aug. 2, 2006), see the conclu-
sion.  
 103.  Robert P. Merges and Jeffery M. Kuhn, Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, An, 
97 Cal. L. Rev. 1, p.14 (2009): “ District of Columbia Circuit recently reversed the FTC’s ruling 
that Rambus acted anticompetitively by failing to disclose its patents, bolstering the conclusion 
that antitrust law is ill-equipped to handle even straightforward disputes involving patents and 
standards.”  . 
 104.  Richard J. Gilbert, Deal OR No Deal? Licensing Negotiations By Standard-Setting Or-
ganizations, 2011-12-01, note 16, “no SSO, court, or enforcement agency has offered a workable 
and generally accepted definition of fair and reasonable licensing terms.”
 105.  RAMBUS INCORPORATED v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 522 F.3d 456, 
(2008), p5. The court upheld : “deceit merely enabling a monopolist to charge higher prices than 
it otherwise could have charged. . . would not in itself constitute monopolization.”
 106.  Research in Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788,792-97 (N.D. Tex. 
2008)  
 107.  Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, p.5 (2006) 
 108.  Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act, S. Res. 1595 100th Cong. §438. “Title 
II: Patent Misuse Doctrine Reform - Provides that no patent owner shall be denied relief or 
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the cooperative efforts by judicial and legislative branches, finding patent 
misuse and finding antitrust violation conduct could have become the 
chicken or the egg causality dilemma. The good news is that the Intellec-
tual Property Antitrust Protection Act is passed by the Senate only and has 
not yet become a law.  Nevertheless, the applicability of patent misuse 
doctrine in the antitrust law regime remains controversial. 
Some advocated that reconciliation is to treat patent misuse doctrine 
independent from antitrust inquiries.109  Another way to reconcile may be 
referred in the recent case Princo Corp. (2010), which required both ele-
ments, conducts hurting competition and patent misuse by patentee, for 
finding antitrust violations when patent pool is involved.110
In sum, the application of patent misuse doctrine to antitrust viola-
tions stays vigorously debated and is not yet a settled rule. 
C. Brief Conclusion 
For over a century, the US antitrust review standard on patent pool 
arrangement is never a settled law.  Even the application of the traditional 
“per se illegal”111 and the “rule of reason”112 standard on SSO’s patent 
pool arrangement has been going back and forth.  It is not until the recent 
decade the courts have become consistent in recognizing the pro-compet-
itive effect of the SSO’s patent pool, and have firmly applied the rule of 
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by virtue of his or her licensing 
practices, actions, or inactions relating to the patent, unless such conduct violates the antitrust 
laws.”
 109.  Marshall Leaffer, Patent Misuse And Innovation, 10 J. HIGH TECH. L. 142 (2010) 
discuss policy concerns in IV. How Misuse Differs from Antitrust and and V. Why Patent Mis-
use Should Not Be Coextensive with Antitrust Law. Also see C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc.,
157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “Patent misuse is viewed as a broader wrong than antitrust 
violation because of the economic power that may be derived from the patentee’s right to ex-
clude. Thus misuse may arise when the conditions of antitrust violation are not met. “
 110.  Princo Corp. v. International Trade Com’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Windsurf-
ing Intern. INC. v. AMF, INC ,782 F.2d 995, 1002, (1986):”factual determination must reveal 
that the overall effect of the license tends to restrain competition unlawfully in an appropriately 
defined relevant market.” ; 
 111.  “Per se illegal” standard allows a court to condemn certain antitrust conducts without 
inquiring the harm to competition because the conduct possesses “pernicious effect on compe-
tition and lack of any redeeming virtue, are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable, therefore 
illegal per se.” Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958)”; also see United 
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, (1940): Plaintiff just need to prove that the 
conduct occurred and within the per se category (without showing competitive abuse).  
 112.  “Rule of reason”, on the other hand, requires the court to inquire the reasonableness of 
restrains and to determine whether the anticompetitive effects of the restrains outweigh its pro-
competitive effects. See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1; Chicago 
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 
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reason to review SSO’s pooling arrangement.113 However, certain con-
ducts, despite their well-recognized pro-competitive effect, remain prohib-
ited as per se illegal.114  Despite the possible per se rulings, it appears that 
the Court now tends to follow the ruling that patent law trumps antitrust 
law, a trend tracing back more than a century ago.115  The trend is to apply 
the rule of reason standard in determining whether the SSO’s patent pool 
arrangement violates antitrust law as a settled law in the US.116 However, 
“[t]he truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are 
less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘Rule of Reason’ tend
to make them appear.”117
Based on the US antitrust enforcements on SSO’s SEP holders’ con-
ducts, the comment by the USCBC, which promulgated ROR for antitrust 
reviews, on SEP is not substantially deviated from the current develop-
ment of US law.  China’s new antitrust guidelines, which take into account 
the pro-competitive effects of SEP (similar to ROR) but preserve only a 
few “clear cut” analyses for antitrust review, are not substantially deviated 
from the current US law.
AIPLA promulgated the FRAND obligations as the successful mech-
anism for thousands of SSO.  The development of the US law, however, 
shows that the doctrine remains controversial.  In addition, a potential di-
lemma by using a patent misuse doctrine for antitrust review may exist 
 113.  Princo Corp. v. International Trade Com’n, 616 F.3d, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010): “it is now 
well settled that an agreement among joint venturer to pool their research efforts is analyzed 
under the rule of reason” Also See U.S. Phillips Corp. v. International Trade Com’n,424 F.3d 
1179 (2005) citing Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Hyundai Elecs., 49 F.Supp.2d 893, 901 
(E.D.Tex.1999) : “describing how “extremely expensive and time-consuming” it is for parties 
to license and manage the licensing of technology by using individual patents and how it is 
preferable to employ a patent portfolio.”
 114.  FTC Report, Antitrust Enforcement And Intelletcual Property Rights:Promoting Inno-
vation and Competition, APRIL 2007,  “Agencies will still condemn as per se illegal activities 
designed to reduce or eliminate competition among members of an SSO—such as bid rigging 
by members who otherwise would compete in licensing technologies for adoption by the SSO 
or naked price fixing on downstream products by members who otherwise would compete in 
selling downstream products compliant with the standard.”
 115.  Townshend v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1011, 1018 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
28, 2000): “Given that a patent holder is permitted under the antitrust laws to completely exclude 
others from practicing his or her technology, the Court finds that 3Com’s submission of pro-
posed licensing terms with which it was willing to license does not state a violation of the anti-
trust laws.”  Comparing with Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. 224 U.S. 1, 224 U. S. 3 (1912):”The patent 
statute is one creating and protecting a true monopoly granted to subserve a broad public policy, 
and it should be construed so as to give effect to a wise and beneficial purpose.”
 116.  Princo Corp. v. International Trade Com’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010):” it is now 
well settled that an agreement among joint venturers to pool their research efforts is analyzed 
under the rule of reason.”
 117.  Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779, 119 S.Ct. 1604, 143 L.Ed.2d 935 (1999) 
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between US legislature and US case law. Rather, the Disclosure and 
FRAND requirement are the two most litigated issues regarding patent 
misuse claims in SSO’s patent pooling arrangement.118 A deeper analysis 
on the effect of the Disclosure and FRAND requirement may be necessary. 
Given the constraint of the rule of reason as a settled law in China 
and the US, this study intends to review the legitimacy of applying the 
FRAND and Disclosure rule for antitrust review by evaluating whether the 
adverse effects of the rules outweigh the benefits under ROR. 
IV.  ECONOMIC THEORIES RELATED TO SSO’S PATENT
POOLING AGREEMENTS AND SEP HOLDERS’ RIGHTS 
A. Economic Literature Review 
As effect comes into the scene of legal disputes, economic theories 
may be consulted to determine whether antitrust violation exists.  It is not 
a new approach to incorporate economic theories into legal analysis.  In 
theMicrosoft case, the government used the game theory and accused Mi-
crosoft of strategic entry deterrence and maliciously raising the costs of 
rivals.119 Accordingly, a more careful review for the use of economic the-
ories on patent pool may be useful for resolving controversial legal issues. 
As concluded in previous paragraphs, the Court relies on the rule of 
reason analysis to determine the efficiency of SSO’s pooling arrangement,
which evaluates whether the benefits of a SSO’s restrain outweighs the 
anticompetitive effects.  In order to illustrate the societal benefits of patent 
pooling, few recent economic papers are examined and summarized. 
Shapiro (2001)120 proposed that complimentary patent pooling may 
mitigate “royalty stacking” which is likely to frustrate the emergence of 
optimal technologies.  He explained the concept by using Cournot’s model 
and concluded that “a package license for all N components would lead to 
higher (combined) profits and lower prices for consumers,” and a monop-
olist has an incentive to coordinate the standard development due to higher 
profit. 
 118.  FTC Report, Antitrust Enforcement And Intelletcual Property Rights:Promoting Inno-
vation and Competition, 2007, p42-53   
 119.  United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98–1232, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) para. 45,098 
(D.D.C. filed May 1998) (Justice Department complaint). 
 120.  Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Stand-
ard Setting, Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1 Jan 2001.  
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Gilbert (2004)121 reviewed a century of antitrust treatment on patent 
pooling, and concluded that the courts rarely concerned the substitutes or 
complimentary nature of the pooling.  He indicated that joint-defense of 
weak substitute patents may increase expected royalties but may decrease 
royalties if the patents are complimentary.  In other words, incorporating 
substitute and weak patents in patent pool may incur additional cost to 
manufacture thus harmful to society.  By giving scores to the court’s rul-
ings, Gilbert concluded that the courts paid too much attention to down-
stream restraints which “does not necessarily imply that a pooling arrange-
ment is anticompetitive.” Therefore, he suggested the court should first 
review the competitive relationships of the patents in the pool then deter-
mining the anti- or pro-competitive effect under rule of reasoning. 
Daniel Quint (2006) proposed that pools of essential patents are Pa-
reto-improving whenever they occur. Pools of nonessential patents can be 
welfare-negative, even when the included patents are all complimen-
tary.122
Jeitschkoy and Zhang (2011)123 inspected whether the formation of 
patent pools is welfare enhancing when patents are complimentary.  Con-
trary to the conventional belief that complimentary patent pooling is wel-
fare enhancing, they found that complimentary patent pools could still be 
welfare decreasing when the development incentives of the downstream 
are considered.  In addition, consumer surplus may be reduced if the pa-
tents are licensed on an up-front fee basis.124
Jay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach (2013)125 added the factor of invalid 
possibility of weak patents and concluded that patent pools can have the 
litigation-deterrent chilling effect.  The patent pool’s patentee with weak 
patents may charge higher royalties licensing fees than independent pa-
tentee, and thus discourage further innovations.
 121.  Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools:A Century of Policy Evolution, STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶84 - ¶87, 2004: “What are the economic consequences of a joint defense 
agreement?. . .Under these assumptions, cooperation in the defense of weak patents increases 
expected royalties if the patents are substitutes and decreases expected royalties if the patents 
are complements.”
 122.  Daniel Quint, Economics of Patent Pools When Some(but not all) Patents are Essential, 
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 0628, Stanford 
University( 2006) 
 123.  Thomas D. Jeitschkoy and Nanyun Zhang, Patent Pools and Product Development: 
Perfect Complements Revisited, October 14, 2011 
 124.  Thomas D. Jeitschkoy and Nanyun Zhang, Adverse Effects of Patent Pooling on Prod-
uct Development and Commercialization, EAG 12-5, July 2012  
 125.  Jay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach, Patent Pools, Litigation and Innovation, October, 
2013. In its conclusion remark:” if patents are relatively weak, patent pools can be used as a 
mechanism to deter litigation that would invalidate the patents in the pool.”
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The above-mentioned papers brilliantly answer several questions re-
garding the general social welfare of SSO’s patent pooling, but do not an-
swer some controversy from legal practitioner’s perspective. Particularly, 
the economic models do not resolve whether the Court should establish 
antitrust violation element to prove patent misuse or should establish pa-
tent misuse element to prove antitrust violation.  These analyses do not 
focus on evaluating consumers’ welfare enhanced by SEP holders’ com-
mitment of the FRAND or Disclosure rule which legal practitioners are 
concerned the most.126  This study attempts to make up for the missing part 
of the literature in the past and proposes an economic model revised from 
traditional models to analyze and resolve the above legal issue. 
B. Model Presented 
In general, courts today apply the rule of reason to determine whether 
the benefit of SEP holders’ patent arrangement outweighs the anti-com-
petitive effect as discussed before. This study follows the rule and focuses 
on analyzing the societal effect, the consumer surplus, and the patent pool 
arrangement as affected by FRAND and Disclosure requirement in light 
of the interest of two distinct groups: Product-Centric Developers and Pa-
tent-Centric Developer.  The competing interest of the two groups in form-
ing one single patent pool is not well discussed but is recognized by one 
legal scholar Jorge L. Contreras in 2013.127
In order to reflect real world practice, the models proposed in the next 
paragraph further divide Product-Centric Developer into two groups: one 
is the member of SSO’s technical reviewing committee who is usually the 
initial promoter of a standard, and the other is merely a contributor.128  In 
theory, the initial promoter may or may not have the first move advantage 
in competition.  If the initial promoter does not utilize first move ad-
 126.  Consumer’s welfare is the most important beneficial societal effect under Chinese 
AML Article 1. Also see ShouWen Zhang, Economic Law 2nd edition, p. 241 Beijing: Renmin 
University Press, 2012; and Russell Pittman, Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for 
Antitrust Enforcement, EAG Discussion Papers, EAG 07-9, June 2007. Also see Robert H. 
Lande and Neil W. Averitt , Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Con-
sumer Protection Law Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 65, p. 713, 1997. 
 127.  Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis 
of An Empirical Study, 53 Jurimetrics J. 163 2013. 
 128.  See Blue-Ray Standard for example, Employees of each Contributor Member formed 
a Technical Expert Group (TEG) which submits format proposal to Joint Technical Committee 
for review and confirm.  Joint Technical Committee consists of persons from each BOD Member 
Company, the TEG Chairs, the JTC Chair and JTC Vice Chairs. Available at http://blu-ray-
disc.com/Assets/Downloadablefile/BDA_Committee_Rules_v1.7.pdf access 05/25 2016 
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vantage, the Cournot Competition Model is assumed. If the initial pro-
moter does utilize first move advantage, Stackelberg Competition Model 
is assumed. 
The competition model proposed in this study may not reflect the real 
world with exact accuracy, but it is hoped to show that violating antitrust 
patent misuse does not necessarily warrant an antitrust violation under cer-
tain negotiation circumstances. 
The models proposed: 
Assuming two Product-Centric Developers, Firm 1 and Firm 2, com-
pete in the market with price equation as P=a-q1-q2, with manufacture 
quantities q1 and q2 respectively.  Firm 1 is willing to license at royalty R1,
and Firm 2 is willing to license at royalty R2. Another Patent-Centric De-
veloper Firm 3 is willing to license at royalty R3.  Manufacturing cost is 
fixed as C.  Following the price equation, the consumer surplus is equal to 
૚
૛
 (q1+q2)2=
૚
૛
Q2.  The differences of total quantity produced in each prop-
osition will be high lightened for evaluating the consumer surplus because 
consumer surplus is the legitimate reason to apply antitrust penalty on 
firms and the major societal benefit that the legal practitioners care.129
Proposition 1.1: Assuming Firm 1 and Firm 2 will follow Cournot 
Competition without corporation, all the patents are complimentary, and 
Firm 1, 2, 3 are compliant with FRAND and Disclosure rule: 
Stage 1, Firm 1, 2, 3 submit royalty rate R1, R2, R3 to SSO’s patent 
pool. 
Stage 2, Firm 1 and Firm 2 determined capacity q1*, q2* respectively 
based on R1+R2+R3. 
With the knowledge of royalty rate R1, R2, R3, Firm 1 will seek to 
maximize its profit ȯ1= q1(a-q1-q2-C) +R1 q2-(R3+R2) q1
Firm 2 seeks to maximize its profit ȯ 2= q2(a-q1-q2-C) +R2 q1-
(R3+R1) q2
 129.  See Supra note 15.  
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Since Firm 3 disclose royalty rate for Firm 1 and Firm 2 to contem-
plate product manufacturing, therefore maximized ʌ1 ʌ2 under Cournot 
Competition model will give us q1* and q2* respectively as below: 
Öப஠ଵ
ப୯ଵ
=0 ; ப஠ଶ
ப୯ଶ
=0 
Öq1*=
૚
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૜
(2R2- R1+R3); q2*=
૚
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૜
 (2R1-R2+R3).   
Societal total capacity Q*=q1*+q2*=
૛
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૜
 (R1+R2+2R3)烊
Firm 3 collects royalty ʌ3= R3 x[
૛
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૜
 (R1+R2+2R3)] 
Maximizing ʌ3 => dʌ3/dR3=0, => R*3 =
૚
૛
 (a-c)-૚
૝
(R1+ R2)
ʌ*3 = [
૚
૛
 (a-c)-૚
૝
(R1+ R2)] x [
૛
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૜
 (R1+R2+2(
૚
૛
 (a-c)-૚
૝
(R1+ R2)))]
=[૚
૛
 (a-c)-૚
૝
(R1+ R2)] * [
૚
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૟
(R1+ R2)] 
=૚
૟
(a-c)2- ૚
૟
(R1+ R2) (a-c) +
૚
૛૝
(R1+ R2)2; Total Q*=
૚
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૟
(R1+ R2)
Proposition 1.2: Assuming Firm 1 and Firm 2 will follow Cournot 
Competition and Nash equilibrium without corporation, all the patents are 
complimentary, and Firm 3 is compliant with FRAND but NOT the Dis-
closure rule: 
Therefore, in Stage 1: Firm 1, 2 submit royalty rate R1 and R2 to 
SSO’s patent pool.
In Stage 2: Firm 1, 2 determine capacity q’1* and q’2* respectively 
based on R1+R2 without the knowledge of R3.
In Stage 3: Firm 3 “hijack” or collect royalty after Firm 1 and Firm 2 
manufacture at the quantity level of Q’= q’1* + q’2*
R
1
R
2
R
3
q
1
*
+
q
2
*
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Ö ப஠ଵ
ப୯ଵ
=0 ; ப஠ଶ
ப୯ଶ
=0 
Ö q’1*=
૚
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૜
(2R2- R1);
q’2*=
૚
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૜
 (2R1-R2);
Q’= q’1*+ q’2*=
૛
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૜
 (R1+R2)
Profit of Firm 3: 
ʌ’3= R3 x[
૛
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૜
 (R1+R2)]  which is
૛
૜
 (R3)2 greater than Firm 3’s
profit in Proposition 1.1 where ʌ3=R3* [
૛
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૜
 (R1+R2+2R3)]. 
Despite the non-disclosure, Firm 3 does not need to give Firm 1 and 
Firm 2 an official infringement notice to collect royalties.  Rather, Firm 3 
may take advantage of the constructive marking statue to collect patent 
damages up to 6 years.130  If Firm 3 chooses not to disclose, the additional 
૛
૜
 (R3)2  royalties is still collectable, and Firm 1 and Firm 2 will not adjust 
its capacity until receiving actual notices. 
Moreover, since consumer surplus is proportional to the total quan-
tity Q, it can be higher if Firm 3 does not disclose its patent within the 6 
years limitation. 
 130.  See American Medical Systems Inc. v. Medical Engineering Corp, 28 USPQ2d 1321 
(Fed. Cir. 1993), for method or process claim, a patentee does not have to mark or provide actual 
notice to infringer because there is nothing to mark. Also 35 U.S.C. Sec. 287(a). also 35 U.S. 
Code § 286 gives patentee 6 years to bring law suit.  
R1
R2
q'
1
*
+
q'
2
*
R3
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Increasing the number of Product-Centric firms in the patent pool will 
not change the result where consumer is better off if one of the firms in the 
patent pool conceals its patent.  Assuming we have n firms, and Firm 1, 2, 
3. . . to Firm n-1 is Product-centric and the final Firm n is Patent Centric 
Firm , all the patents are complimentary, and total quantity 
=Q=q1+q2+…qn-1, and total royalty Rs=R1+R2+..Rn-1
Ö the total quantity produced will be Qn=ܖି૚
ܖ
 (a-c)-ܖି૛
ܖ
 Rs-(n-
1)Rn131 (The total quantity produced without “concealing”)
If the final firm Āconcealsā its patent, Firms are not aware of the 
royalty Rn.  The total quantity produced will be: 
Ö Qn’=ܖି૚
ܖ
 (a-c)-ܖି૛
ܖ
 Rs. 
Ö Qn’>Qn
Therefore, consumers are better off if Firm n conceal its patent when 
patent pool is formed because Consumer Surplus is higher (૚
૛
Qn’2 > ૚
૛
Qn2).  
For the ease of illustration, only the three Firms scenarios are used, dis-
cussed, and compared hereafter. 
Proposition 2.1: Assuming firm 1 and firm 2 follows Stackelberg 
Competition Model without corporation, Firm 1 is the founding member 
thus enjoys the first move advantage when it receives royalty rates from 
Firm 2 and Firm 3; Firm 2 and Firm 3 are contributors.  All the patents are 
complimentary, and Firm 1, 2, 3 follow FRAND and Disclosure rule. 
Stage 1: Firm 1, 2, 3 submit royalty rate R1, R2, R3 to SSO’s patent 
pool, and 
Firm 1, with the first move advantage, seeks to maximize its profit 
with the knowledge of Firm 2’s best response function at royalty rate R1,
R2, R3. 
ȯ1= q1(a-q1-q2-C) +R1 q2-(R3+R2) q1
Stage 2: Firm 2 seeks to maximize its profit under the condition of 
Firm 1’s capacity q1* and the knowledge of royalty rate R1, R2, R3.
ȯ2= q2(a-q1-q2-C) +R2 q1-(R3+R1) q2 ; Total Quantity Q= q1*+ q2*
 131. Profit equation for firm 1to firm n as below:  
ʌ1= q1(a-Q-C-σ ௡ଶ ) +R1σ ௡ିଵଶ ˗ʌ2= q2(a-Q-C-σ ௡௜ஷଶ ) +R1σ ௡ିଵ௜ஷଶ . . .ʌn-1  ; But ʌn= Q*Rn ; 
ப஠ଵ
ப୯ଵ
=0,ப஠ଶ
ப୯ଶ
=0, …to  μʌn-1/ μqn-1 =0 give us 
q1=a-c-Q- σ ௡௜ஷଵ  = a-c-Q-Rs+R1-Rn˗ q2=a-c-Q-Rs+R2-Rn;. . .qn-1=a-c-Q-Rs+Rn-1 -Rn˗
i=1,2,3. . .n 
 add all equation, q1, q2,to qn-1  =>  q1+q2+. . .qn-1=Q=(n-1)(a-c-Q)-(n-1)Rs+Rs -(n-1) Rn 
Therefore, if n firm in a patent pool, the total quantity produced will be Qn=ܖି૚
ܖ
 (a-c)-ܖି૛
ܖ
 Rs-
(n-1)Rn
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Following Stackelberg Competition Model, Firm 1 and Firm 2 are 
aware of R3 when maximizing their profitȯ1 andȯ2.  Therefore: 
Ö Solve Stackelberg Competition problem132,
Ö q1*=
૚
૛
 (a-c)-૚
૛
(2R2 +R3); 
q2*=
૚
૝
 (a-c)-૚
૝
 (2R1-2R2+R3);
Total Q=૜
૝
 (a-c)-૚
૝
 (2R1+2R2+3R3)
ʋ3= R3 x Q =R3 x [
૜
૝
 (a-c)-૚
૝
 (2R1+2R2+3R3)]
if dʌ3/dR3=0 => R*3 =
૚
૛
 (a-c)-૚
૜
(R1 +R2);
ʌ*3=ሾ
૚
૛
 (a-c)-૚
૜
(R1 +R2)]x[
૜
૝
 (a-c)-૚
૝
 (2R1+2R2+3(
૚
૛
 (a-c)-૚
૜
(R1 +R2)))]
= ሾ૚
૛
 (a-c)-૚
૜
(R1 +R2)] x[
૜
ૡ
(a-c) -૚
૝
(R1+R2)] 
= ૜
૚૟
 (a-c)2 -૚
૝
(R1+R2) (a-c) +
૚
૚૛
(R1 +R2)2
R*3 =Min| 
૚
૛
 (a-c)-૚
૜
(R1 +R2)
Total Q*=૜
ૡ
 (a-c)-૚
૝
 (R1+R2)
Proposition 2.2: Assume Firm 1 and Firm 2 will follow Stackelberg 
Competition without corporation; Firm 1 is the founding member thus en-
joying the first move advantage; Firm 2 and Firm 3 are contributors.  All 
the patents are complimentary, and Firm 3 follows FRAND but NOT the 
 132.  Given q1 and ப஠ଶப୯ଶ=0, the best reaction function S2 for Firm 2, the value of q2 maximizing 
ʌ2, is derived. Firm 1 therefore may maximize its profit by finding best quantity q1* under the 
condition of knowing the reaction function S2of Firm2. => ʌ1= q1(a-q1- S2-C) +R1 S2-(R3+R2) q1.
q1* can be derived by maximizing ʌ1, ப஠ଵப୯ଵ=0.
q
1
*
+
q
2
*
R1
R2
R3
q2*
R1
R2
R3
q1*
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Disclosure rule. Therefore, Firm 1 and Firm 2 are NOT aware of R3 when 
maximizing their profitȯ1 andȯ2. 
Stage 1: Firm 1 seeks to maximize its profit ȯ1= q1(a-q1-q2-C) +R1
q2-R2q1 with the knowledge of Firm 2’s best response function and royalty 
rate R1 and R2.
Stage 2: Firm 2 seeks to maximize its profit ȯ2= q2(a-q1-q2-C) +R2
q1-R1 q2 under the condition of Firm 1’s capacity q1* and the knowledge 
of royalty rate R1 and R2. 
Stage 3: After Firm 1 and Firm 2 produce capacity q’1* and q’2*, Firm 
3 “hijack” the standard within 6 year limitation to collect patent damages. 
Solve Stackelberg Competition problem as proposition 2.1: 
Ö q’1*=
૚
૛
 (a-c)-R2;
q’2*=
૚
૝
 (a-c)-૚
૛
 (R1-R2);
Total Q’ =q’1* + q’2*=
૜
૝
 (a-c)-૚
૛
 (R1+R2) ; The total quantity pro-
duced Q’ under proposition 2.2 is higher than the total quantity produced 
Q in Proposition 2.1. 
i.e. Q’=૜
૝
 (a-c)-૚
૛
 (R1+R2) > Q=
૜
૝
 (a-c)-૚
૝
 (2R1+2R2+3R3). 
=> Consumer surplus: ૚
૛
Q’2> ૚
૛
Q2
ʌ’3= R3*
૚
૛
Q’= R3*[
૜
૝
 (a-c)- ૚
૛
(R1+R2)]> ʌ3= R3 x [
૜
૝
 (a-c)- ૚
૝
(2R1+2R2+3R3)]
  Again, similar to Cournot Competition, consumer is better off if 
Firm 3 does not disclose its patent initially. Firm 3 shall have incentive to 
do so because ʌ’3> ʌ3.
Proposition 3.1: Assume Firm 1 and Firm 2 will coordinate to create 
a monopoly patent pool and divide the capacity.  All the patents are com-
plimentary, and Firm 3 is compliant with FRAND and Disclosure rule: 
R
1
R
2
q'
R
1
R
2
q'
2
q'
1
*
+
q' *
R
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Noting that the maximum profit of the monopoly company is Max ȯ
= Q*(a-Q-c) = ૚
૝
(a-c) 2 with capacity at ૚
૛
(a-c). In the absence of Firm 3, 
Firm 1 and Firm 2 may share the capacity and profit equally.  However, if 
the 3rd firm’s patent interest is concerned:
ʌ1=q1*(a- q1-q2-c-R3- R2)] +R1q2
ʌ2= q2*(a- q1-q2-c-R3- R1)]+ R2q1
Given the divided capacity q1= q2, the best strategy for the two collu-
sive firms (Firm 1and Firm 2) is to maximize ʌ1+ʌ2, given q1= q2, 
=> 
ʌ=ʌ1+ʌ2=q1(2a- 4q1-2c-2R3)]  dʌ/dq1=0 => q1*=
ଵ
ସ
 (a-c-R3)
q2*=
ଵ
ସ
 (a-c-R3) ; Q=
ଵ
ଶ
 (a-c-R3); 
ʌ3= R3x
૚
૛
 (a-c-R3);
Maximizing ʌ3, dʌ3/dR3=0 
The Firm 3 will charge royalty at R3*=
૚
૛
(a-c) , ʌ3*=
૚
૝
(a-c)2 => Total 
Q=ଵ
ସ
 (a-c); 
Proposition 3.2: Assume Firm 1 and Firm 2 will coordinate a monop-
oly pool to divide market; all the patents are complimentary; and Firm 3 
is compliant with FRAND but NOT the Disclosure rule: 
q’1*=
૚
૝
 (a-c)= q’2*
Q’=૚
૛
 (a-c) 
ʌ'3= R3*
૚
૛
 (a-c) >ʌ3= R3 x
૚
૛
 (a-c-R3)
Consumer surplus ૚
૛
Q’2 > ૚
૛
Q2
In each scenario from proposition 1 to proposition 3, Firm 3 has the 
incentive to conceal or “hijack” because its profit can be higher ʌ'3>ʌ3.     
In each scenario, consumers are better off if Firm 3 does not follow the 
Disclosure rule.  Accordingly, the pro-competitive effect of non-disclosure 
by firm 3 outweighs its anti-competitive effect at least from consumers’ 
point of view. This result thus calls for a doubt on the applicability patent 
misuse doctrine as a part of the antitrust punishment on Firm 3’s non-dis-
closure action. 
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V.   ANALYSIS AND MATHEMATICAL CONCLUSION 
A. Disclosure Rule May Not Enhance Consumer Surplus Under 
Rule of Reason 
Under the current patent law, royalties generally accrue from the 
date actual notice is given except that the patentee asserts only process or 
method claims.133 If so, Firm 3 may thus avoid the notice requirement and 
collect royalties from Firm 1 and Firm 2 prior to actual disclosure if its 
claim involves method claim only.  Accordingly, Firm 1 and Firm 2 may 
have manufactured at a capacity without contemplating Firm 3’s patent if 
Firm 3 chose not to follow the Disclosure rule as in Proposition 1.2, 2.2, 
3.2.  The total quantities produced in different situations are shown below: 
Table 1 
Total Q (q1+q2)
(Firm 3 disclose)  
Total Q (q1+q2)
(Firm 3 conceal) 
Firm 1 and Firm 2 
in Cournot Compe-
tition  
૛
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૜
 (R1+R2+2R3)/ 
or ૚
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૟
(R1+ R2)
૛
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૜
 (R1+R2)
Firm 1 and Firm 2 
in Stackelberg 
Competition 
૜
૝
 (a-c)-૚
૝
 (2R1+2R2+3R3)/ or
૜
ૡ
 (a-c)-૚
૝
 (R1+R2)
૜
૝
 (a-c)-૚
૛
 (R1+R2)
Firm 1 and Firm 2 
coordinate duopoly
ଵ
ଶ
 (a-c-R3);or
ଵ
ସ
 (a-c) ૚
૛
 (a-c)
As Table 1 indicates, total quantity Q produced is greater if Firm 3 
does not disclose its patent to SSO in every scenario.  Firm 3’s non-dis-
closure action brings more products available and promoting competition 
in the market.  Recall Consumer surplus is ૚
૛
Q2, and this means consumers 
are thus better off if Firm 3 conceals its patent from SSO members. 
Under the rule of reason, if pro-competitive effect outweighs anti-
competitive effect, no antitrust violations shall be found.  It is well known 
that Firm 3’s non-disclosure action may constitute patent misuse as FTC 
asserted.134 The concealing action, however, does not always constitute 
antitrust violations under rule of reason at least from consumers’ point of 
 133.  Crown Packaging Technology, Inc. v. Reexam Beverage Can Co. ,559 F.3d 1308, 
(2009) 
 134.  In re Rambus Inc., FTC Docket No. 9302, p.118-119, (Aug. 2, 2006) 
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view.  Accordingly, patent misuse conduct alone does not guarantee an 
antitrust violation. 
Assuming Firm 3’s non-disclosure action constitutes patent misuse, 
the model then points out that the bill, Intellectual Property Antitrust Pro-
tection Act 1989,135 is not logically sound. 
This study does not aim to demonstrate the model accurately simu-
lating patent negotiation.  It is intended to prove that under certain condi-
tions patent misuse Disclosure rule alone is ill-suited in proving antitrust 
violation.  Moreover, it does not aim to prove Firm 3’s conduct is legiti-
mate either. Rather, if Firm 1 and Firm 2 are harmed by Firm 3’s conceal-
ing behavior, the injured parties may resort to contract law remedy, fraud, 
or any other allowable remedies except the remedy under antitrust law. 
B. The Recent Development of Economic Theories Re-Confirms 
the Appropriate Application of Rule of Reason Standard As 
Suggested 
The economic papers mentioned above, such as Shapiro (2001), sup-
ported existence of pro-competitive nature of patent pooling arrangement 
in SSO, although other papers, such as Jay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach 
(2013), indicated the anti-competitive nature of certain patent pooling ar-
rangements. 
In this study, the concealing action of its patent by Firm 3, although 
disputable  induces more quantities produced and consumer may benefit 
from it. Although the antitrust review standard has “swung back and forth”
between the traditional “per se illegal” and the “rule of reason” as men-
tioned, this study and the recent economic theories have helped to recon-
firm that traditional “per se illegal” standard ’may be inappropriate in re-
viewing SSO’s patent pool action, except in rare conditions.  Viewing 
from consumer surplus, applying the “rule of reason” standard to deter-
mine the SSO’s patent pool arrangement for different business scenarios 
is appropriate under SDOAA and as the Princo court ruled.136
Accordingly, ROR suggestion by USCBC is supported by both cur-
rent US antitrust law and economic theories. 
135. A bill prohibits the patentee being deemed guilty of misuse by virtue of his or her li-
censing practices unless such conduct violates the antitrust laws.
 136.  Princo Corp. v. International Trade Com’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010):” it is now 
well settled that an agreement among joint venturers to pool their research efforts is analyzed 
under the rule of reason.”
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C. The FRAND Assessment Remains a Non-Workable Definition 
Due to the Possible Wide Range of Royalty Based on Different 
Lawful Competition Practice 
Several commentators have criticized the difficulty of evaluating the 
reasonableness of the royalty rate.  In order to evaluate the problem, the 
proposed model is used to calculate the reasonableness of Firm 3’s royalty 
rate. It is assumed that Firm 3 discloses the rate R*3 when forming the 
patent pool and the royalty rate R*3, otherwise firm 1 and firm 2 will turn 
to adopt alternative technology. 
The royalty rate is based on the profit maximizing assumption of 
Firm 3 and may be in fact lower due to the existence of alternative 
knowledge.  The rate in different scenarios is illustrated below: 
Table 2 
Although each parties essentially following the same basic profit 
model that ȯi= qi(a-qi-qj-C) +Ri qj-(R3+Rj) qi , a wide range of the royalty 
rate differences for Firm 3 is found if it follows Disclosure rule by using 
different legitimate competition methods.137
 137.  Noting that Cournot and Stackelberg competition are the kind of permitted competition 
actions under the antitrust law, but the coordinated duopoly is not.  Comparing Scenario I and 
Firm 3 follows 
FRAND and Dis-
closure rule 
R*3
(rate after profit 
maximization)  
Total Q  
Scenario
I
Firm 1 and Firm 
2 in Cournot 
Competition  
૚
૛
 (a-c)-૚
૝
(R1+ R2)
૛
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૜
(R1+R2+2R3)
or ૚
૜
 (a-c)-૚
૟
(R1+ R2)
Scenario
II
Firm 1 and Firm 
2 in Stackelberg 
Competition 
૚
૛
 (a-c)-૚
૜
(R1 +R2)
૜
૝
(a-c)-
૚
૝
(2R1+2R2+3R3)
or 
૜
ૡ
 (a-c)-૚
૝
 (R1+R2)
Scenario
III 
Firm 1 and Firm 
2 coordinate duo-
poly 
૚
૛
(a-c) ଵ
ସ
(a-c) 
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In Scenario III, despite Firm 1 and Firm 2 coordinate the duopoly 
patent pool prohibited under the antitrust law, Firm 3 does not take a part 
in the collusion.  The antitrust law does not prohibit a patentee to charge 
as the royalty rate as high as possible on monopolists or other SSO mem-
bers.138 In the absence of other antitrust violation, the highest royalty rate 
Firm 3 may charge is ૚
૛
(a-c) under scenario III, or ૚
૜
(R1 +R2) higher than 
scenario II.  Therefore, the legitimate royalty rate difference if comparing 
with all Scenarios could go as high as 4 times in difference, i.e., ૚
૚૛
(R1
+R2)~
૚
૜
(R1 +R2). 
Since the wide range of R3 royalties under each scenario is legiti-
mate, the court would face a challenging task of defining the term Ⱦrea-
sonableȿ under FRAND obligation.  Although the FRAND obligation is 
highly recommended by AIPLA, it does not guarantee a workable mecha-
nism for antitrust enforcement. 
Although AIPLAȽs comment on FRAND is questionable, not all of 
the comments are questionable.  AIPLAȽs suggestion that a mere differ-
ent rate received by two licensees does not necessarily mean an antitrust 
violation may be correct.  Table 2 demonstrates that a difference in royalty 
rate may exist based on different competition assumption.  The law does 
not prohibit Cournot or Stackelberg competition; accordingly it shall not 
prohibit a licensor to initially collect royalty rate based on a reasonable 
prediction of Cournot competition by others but at the end collect royalty 
rate based on the actual Stackelberg competition by others.  Accordingly, 
AIPLAȽs suggestion in this aspect is supported by this study. 
D. SEP Holder’s Exercise of its ȾLegitimateȿ Rights to Charge 
Excessive High Royalty Rates Can Be More Harmful Than the 
Coordinated Monopoly Prohibited by Traditional Per Se 
Illegal 
Referring to Table 2, total quantities produced in Scenario I is ૚
૜
 (a-
c)- ૚
૟
(R1+ R2) after Firm 3 choose a maximized royalty rates under 
II, the royalty rate difference between Cournot and Stackelberg is ૚
૚૛
(R1 +R2).  Comparing Sce-
nario I and III, the royalty rate difference between Cournot and Firm 3’ legitimate royalty  co-
ordinated mo 
 138.  In Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 85 S.Ct. 176, 13 L.Ed.2d 99 (1964), the Court 
explained that a patent “empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with 
the leverage of that monopoly.” Rambus v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, (DC Cir. 2008) “deceit merely 
enabling a monopolist to charge higher prices than it otherwise could have charged—would not 
in itself constitute monopolization.”
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Cournot competition.  The result means: if Firm 1 and Firm 2 “legiti-
mately” choose to charge the total royalty rate, (R1+ R2)>
ଵ
ଶ
(a-c),  then the 
total quantities produced will be fewer than coordinated monopoly by 
Firm 1 and Firm 2 under Scenario III.  The same situation if Firm 1 and 
Firm 2 Ⱦlegitimatelyȿ choose to charge the rate higher than ଵ
ଶ
(a-c). 
The presented models, however, do suggest that the attempt to lower 
royalty rates would generally induce the more production even facing a 
wide range of the reasonable royalty rates involving SSO’s patent pools.139
Although AIPLA criticized that treating License IPR at unfair high 
royalty as antitrust violation would upset the interests of innovators, con-
sumers may be benefit from Chinese government’s effort to reduce royalty 
rates.  The result shows that AIPLA’s comment may be questionable and 
the Chinese government effort in this aspect is legitimate and consistent 
with the goal of Chinese AML, although the efforts might have other stra-
tegic concerns. 
E. The Result Points Out the Intellectual Property Antitrust 
Protection Act 1989 is Not Logically Sound. 
As mentioned before, Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act 
1989 is a bill prohibits the patentee being deemed guilty of misuse by vir-
tue of his or her licensing practices unless such conduct violates the anti-
trust laws.140  The results of the presented model, contrary to Intellectual 
Property Antitrust Protection Act 1989, show that patent misuse (violating 
Disclosure rule) does not necessary guarantee an antitrust violation under 
rule of reason because consumers are better off.  Accordingly, the 1989 
Act is not logically sound if reviewed by the well recognized rule of reason 
standard and the models presented.141
In addition, the result also demonstrates the use of patent misuse doc-
trine for antitrust enforcement remains controversial, and incorporating 
 139.  Referring to table 1 and table 2 total quantities Q calculations, lowering royalty rates 
may induce more quantity produced.  
 140.  i.e., if a patent misuse is found, there must be an antitrust violation. 
 141.  This logic game is quite straight forward:  
Logic Game 1: if the act is correct: if a patent misuse => antitrust violation.   
Logic Game 2: under Rule of Reason and the calculation of this studay: 
if non-disclosure (the existence of a patent misuse) => Consumer is better off => no antitrust 
violation.   
Assuming rule of reason standard and the model calculation is correct, Logic Game 1 must not 
be correct, therefore the Act is not right.  
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the FRAND obligation in the recent antitrust guidelines, as highly recom-
mended by the AIPLA, does not necessarily beneficial to consumers. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
USCBC’s suggestion on applying ROR for China’s antitrust enforce-
ment is generally right.  The development of US law, recent economic 
theories, and the calculation result in this study re-confirm the application 
of ROR standard in determining whether the SSO’s patent pool arrange-
ment is appropriate.  On the other hand, the AIPLA’s suggestion to incor-
porate patent misuse doctrine, the FRAND and Disclosure rule as the ma-
jor factor for antitrust review on SEP holders’ conduct may not be 
appropriate. 
The Non-Disclosure of a SSO’s member against patent misuse doc-
trine may in theory enhance consumer surplus and pro-competitive under 
current legal mechanism. Accordingly, the models proposed in this study 
points out at least one inappropriate application of patent misuse doctrines 
for antitrust review on patent pooling under the ROR standard. 
The FRAND obligation, as highly recommended by the AIPLA, is 
neither fully supported by the current US law nor does it guarantee a work-
able mechanism for antitrust enforcement under economic theories.142
The AIPLA’s suggestion that a mere different rate received by two 
licensees does not necessarily mean an antitrust violation is correct. Ac-
cordingly, the suggestions made by the AIPLA, however, are partially cor-
rect in this study. 
The analysis based on the economic models also indicates that the 
Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act 1989 is not logically sound 
under ROR. 
The wide range of the reasonable royalty rates under the FRAND ob-
ligation assessment would further strengthen the view that “no workable 
definition of fair and reasonable licensing terms can be offered.”143  The 
models, however, also show that lowering royalty rates would induce the 
 142.  In addition to the economic calculations, The FTC report, Supra footnote 7 at p.192 
also states that: “However, there is much debate over whether such RAND or FRAND commit-
ments can effectively prevent patent owners from imposing excessive royalty obligations on 
licensees.” Panelists complained that the terms RAND
and FRAND are vague and ill-defined 
 143.  Richard J. Gilbert, Deal OR No Deal? Licensing Negotiations By Standard-Setting Or-
ganizations, 2011-12-01, P. 859 note 16 
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more production thus benefits consumers.  Accordingly the Chinese gov-
ernment’s efforts to lower excessive high royalty rates charged by the SEP 
holders may be correct under this study. 
In sum, the models echo the D.C. Circuit Court’s ruling that the 
breach of the Disclosure and FRAND commitment under Rambus does not 
necessarily present harm to competition.144  These calculations of con-
sumer surplus help to confirm that certain patent misuse elements alone 
are ill-suited for proving antitrust violations.  Perhaps, patent misuse doc-
trine should be treated as a “broader wrong than antitrust violation”145 and 
distinct from courts’ antitrust review. 
The calculation result shows that China’s new antitrust guidelines ap-
propriately adopted the same review standard in accordance with the basic 
analysis framework of AML when facing SEP issues.  ROR prone review-
ing standard by contemplating pro-competitive features of IPRs is also 
supported by both the US legal wisdom and economic theories. It is fair to 
conclude that the revision of the Chinese antitrust guideline is toward a 
positive direction for consumers. 
Finale – China’s Fast Advancement and Taiwan’s Efforts in Antitrust 
Regulations 
1. Selective Prosecution Against Foreign Companies by Chinese 
Government 
The power of China’s administrative agencies is quite limited when 
facing Chinese government-owned companies, although their power is tre-
mendous against foreign companies.  Antitrust investigations against   
PretroChina, China Telcom, the railroad transportation industry, and the 
banks were conducted but no concrete evidence was found.  The reason is 
that the “administrative ranking” of those state- owned entities is higher 
than the antitrust enforcement agency and the “atmosphere” of those enti-
ties may be too enormous in China.146 Perhaps it is the lack of investiga-
tions against the state-owned companies thus giving the impression that 
China’s administrative agencies “selectively prosecute against foreign 
 144.  Rambus Inc. v. FTC ,522 F.3d 456, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 145.  Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting C.R. Bard., 
Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 146.  Ning Yuan Liu, ed., A study of Chinese Antitrust Law Enforcement from competition 
law’s perspective, Beijing, 2015, law press China. P. 27: The term atmosphere is a courteous 
way to express certain influences by state owned companies.  
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companies.” However, the Chinese government’s official record indicated 
otherwise.147
Reviewing the case QUALCOMM and IDC, the decisions against 
foreign SEP holders are not without merit, although Chinese companies, 
mostly licensees of SEP, also benefit from it.  China’s administrative agen-
cies did not specify a reasonable royalty under the FRAND in Nokia, Mi-
crosoft, or Qualcomm decisions and the market order seemed to be a major 
concern. 
Considering Huawei invested 9.2 billion in R&D in 2015 and began 
to collect patent royalties from Apple,148 it is unlikely that the only purpose 
of the antitrust guideline draft is to limit SEP holders’ right.  Perhaps, the 
purpose of the recent AML movements related to SEP is just to prepare 
for the coming era of Chinese companies’ competition in SEP and profit-
ing from it after hundred billion dollars have been invested in R&D. 
2. China’s Fast Advancement of the AML in SEP Antitrust 
Regulations and Taiwan’s Ineffective Efforts 
The US law currently requires both anticompetitive and patent mis-
use by patentees to find SEP antitrust violations.149 It is a holding favoring 
patentees, while China’s new antitrust policy uses ordinary AML analysis 
framework for SEP review favoring consumers.  Although the FRAND 
obligation on SEP holders is well recognized in the rest of the world and 
is adopted by Chinese courts and administrative agencies, the omission of 
the FRAND obligation in the draft hints Chinese government’s intent to 
develop its own SEP regulation policy. 
Taiwan, an island that produces high-tech products, is supposed to 
eagerly participate in SEP legal regulation event.  Contrarily, no specific 
law is enacted except Article 45 of the Fair Trade Act 2015. Article 45 
provides almost a free pass with very limited restriction on SEP holders’ 
IP right enforcement.150  Another relevant provision for reviewing license 
agreements is only an internal principle of the administrative agency, not 
 147.  http://www.saic.gov.cn/gsld/llyj/xxb/201410/t20141015_149027.html  access 05/25 
2016 the official record shows only 10% of NDRC and 5% of SAIC cases involving foreign 
companies  
 148.  http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/982367.shtml access 05/25 2016 
 149.  Princo Corp. v. International Trade Com’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
 150.  Article 45: No provision of this Act shall apply to any “proper” conduct in connection 
with the exercise of rights pursuant to the provisions of the Copyright Act, Trademark Act, Pa-
tent Act or other Intellectual property laws.  The definition of “proper” is highly uncertain.  
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a law.151  Under the principle, any IP holders ‘market power is not pre-
sumed.  When IP is involved, technology markets and innovation mar-
kets can each constitute independent markets for antitrust review in 
addition to goods markets.  A typical example is the complimentary 
SEP pool formed by Philips, Sony, Taiyo Yuden, is determined to 
have the monopoly power over the CD-R market.  The concerted 
action of three companies to abuse the power violates unfair trade 
law by jointly determining the royalty price, restricting independent 
license, and charging unreasonably high royalty rates. 
The royalty rate is fixed at 10 JPY per disc and making licensees to 
lose money when manufacturing.  The refusal to renegotiate a reasonable 
price in responding to market changes may constitute a violation of Article 
14 of the Unfair Trade Act, because the refusal may restrict business ac-
tivities and result in an impact on the market function with respect to pro-
duction.  Similar to Chinaÿs new antitrust guidelines, Taiwanÿs govern-
ment also refuses to grant SEP holders the right to charge unreasonably 
high royalty rates.  Despite the sanction for each company is just NTD 8 
million (~USD 266,000), NTD 4 million, and NTD 2 million respectively, 
Sony and Taiyo Yuden reduce the royalty rates substantially afterwards.  
Philips refused to join the Āconcerted actionā of lowering price and be-
came the independent licensor to charge high royalty rate without carrying 
the obligation vested upon SSO’s SEP holders. 
The efforts Taiwanese government made to suppress CD-R royalty 
rate were futile. Comparing with the multinational companies’ response, 
for example, Qualcomm, when facing Chinese government, received a 
record high penalty of USD 1 billion but chose to cooperate with Chinese 
government. In contrast, the penalty Taiwanese government imposed on 
Philips is just NTD 4 million (~USD 135,000) and Philips chose not to 
cooperate with Taiwanese government.  Perhaps, competition law is noth-
ing but a tool to rebalance the interests among different interested parties, 
but the precondition for a successful enforcement relies on the economic 
or political power behinds the law.  Taiwan’s limited market is a disad-
vantage for local competition law to grow, while the much larger fast 
growing market in China provides the opportunity for its government to 
develop its own SEP regulation. 
In the absence of substantial and strong economic power, the best 
strategy for Taiwan is not to enact a local competition law to protect or 
enhance local companies’ competitiveness. Instead, Taiwan should face 
 151. The principles for reviewing IP agreements by Fair Trade Commission,බᖹ஺᫆ጤဨ
᭳ᑞ᪊ᢏ⾡ᤵḒ༠㆟᱌௳அ⹦⌮ཎ๎ , http://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/main/doc/docDetail. 
aspx?uid=163&docid=227 access 05/25 2016 
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the competitions around the world and adjust itself to comport its legal 
system with the world’s major economies, so Taiwanese companies can 
pull themselves away from disadvantaged positions in the aspect of legal 
enforcement.  In recent years, there has been a loud voice in Taiwan treat-
ing China and its market as an evil. It is not wise for the sentiment to grow 
or spread, for it blocks people from seeing the reality that China is now 
one of the fastest growing major markets players in the world.  Reviewing 
its recent change on SEP antitrust regulations, the legal development is 
consistent with the goal of consumer protection under AML, is supported 
by economic theories, and is strategically for the protection of its indus-
tries.  It is wise, and it is not evil. 
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GLOSSARY OF SELECTED ABBREVIATED TERMS 
AIPLA American Intellectual Property Law As-
sociation  
AML China’s Anti-Monopoly Law 
DOJ US Department of Justice 
ETSI European Telecommunications Stand-
ards Institute
FRAND Fair, Reasonable And Non-Discrimina-
tory 
FTC US Federal Trade Commission
ITC US International Trade Commission
IDC court Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court  
IDC InterDigital Technology Corporation  
IPR Intellectual Property Right 
MOFCOM The Ministry of Commerce of People’s 
Republic of China
NDRC National Development and Reform 
Commission of the People’s Republic of 
China
the Opinion Opinion on Accelerating the Building of 
IP power under New Conditions
ROR Rule of Reason Standard
SAIC State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce of the People’s Republic of 
China  
SDOAA Standards Development Organization 
Advancement Act of 2004
SEP Standard Essential Patent  
SSO Standard Setting Organization  
USCBC US-China Business Council
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